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Abstract
This thesis consists of two studies on financial market imperfections. The first study
(Chapters 2 and 3) investigates illiquidity, which is a reflection of different imperfections,
and its pricing implications in the corporate bond market. The second study (Chapter 4)
evaluates the impact of a short-sale ban, which is a form of financial constraints, on the
equity and derivatives markets.
In Chapter 2, we propose illiquidity measures that outperform existing ones statistically
and economically. We estimate various illiquidity measures in the corporate bond market,
using transaction-level data from 2002 to 2010. In the cross-section, we find illiquidity
measures to be related to bond characteristics often used as illiquidity proxies. In the
time-series, we show commonality in the aggregate illiquidity measures, increasing during
the subprime crisis and peaking in October 2008. We then identify that time variation in
aggregate illiquidity measures is linked with market variables such as the VIX index.
In Chapter 3, we examine pricing implications of the illiquidity measures. We find that
illiquidity level is priced both at the aggregate level and at the bond level throughout the
sample period. However, the role of illiquidity risk in pricing bond yield spreads is weaker,
and is driven by the 2008 financial crisis.
In Chapter 4, we study the 2008 short-sale ban. We find that the banned stocks have
positive cumulative abnormal returns and become more volatile when the ban is imposed.
We document greater demand and abnormalities in the futures market and option market
4under the short-sale ban. This evidence suggests that a short-sale ban may not stabilize a
financial market in crisis.
Thesis Supervisor: Jiang Wang
Title: Mizuho Financial Group Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis presents two studies under a central theme of financial market imperfections and
their pricing implications. The first study examines methods of quantifying illiquidity and
tests asset pricing implications of illiquidity. The second study evaluates the effects of a
short-sale ban, which is considered to be the extreme case of short-sale constraints, on the
financial market. These two studies are self-contained. The contributions of the thesis are
summarized in this chapter, and will be explained in detail in each study. The thesis is
organized as follows.
For measuring illiquidity, we first review existing illiquidity measures in the literature,
and propose new measures in Chapter 2. We use corporate bond data from 2002 to 2010 to
estimate these measures. The cross-sectional and time-serial characteristics of these measures
are examined. Using these illiquidity measures, we empirically test their pricing implications
of illiquidity level as well as illiquidity risk in Chapter 3. This study makes two contributions.
First, we identify measures that are more robust in terms of statistical significance and
economic significance than previously used measures in the literature. Second, we provide
empirical evidence that illiquidity level, as gauged by various measures, is priced in the
corporate bond market. In contrast, the relation of illiquidity risk and bond yield spreads is
weaker and seems to be driven by the 2008 financial crisis.
In Chapter 4, we focus on the short-sale ban established on September 18, 2008 by SEC
(the US Securities and Exchange Commission) in response to the financial crisis. We first
study how the short-sale ban impacts the equity market. We show that banned stocks are
overvalued relative to the four factor model, and their returns are more volatile relative to
the market. In addition, the effects of the ban on the derivatives market are examined.
15
16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Empirical tests show that the short-sale ban also affects the futures market and the option
market, as seen in several variables such as futures premiums and option implied volatility.
These main findings provide evidence that short-sale bans may not stabilize the financial
market as expected.
Chapter 2
Measuring Illiquidity of Corporate
Bonds
2.1 Introduction
Liquidity of an asset is how easy it is to trade that asset without causing price movement.
The lack of liquidity or illiquidity arises from various market frictions such as information
asymmetry, imperfection competition, transaction costs, and others [Vayanos and Wang
(2012)]. Given the recent financial crisis, the importance of understanding illiquidity can
not be overstated.1 Two questions about illiquidity are central to our study. First, how
can illiquidity be measured and what are its properties? Second, what are the asset pricing
implications of illiquidity in the corporate bond market?
The first question of how illiquidity can be quantified has been investigated by a number
of studies. Existing solutions range from using bid-ask spreads or asset characteristics as
illiquidity proxies to constructing illiquidity measures motivated by theory or empirical facts.
Each set of these measures will be briefly reviewed.
The literature on bid-ask spreads as well as heuristic measures is abundant. One of
the early studies that investigates the use of bid-ask spreads is Amihud and Mendelson
(1986). They present a model in which expected returns should increase with illiquidity
as measured by bid-ask spreads and provide supporting empirical evidence from the early
stock market. Different characteristics and trading activity variables have also been used as
1Brunnermeier (2009) gives an overview of the 2008 financial crisis and the interaction between market
liquidity and funding liquidity.
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illiquidity proxies. For example, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use bond characteristics,
namely age, maturity, issuance, and raiting, to proxy for illiquidty in studying its relation
to corporate bond yield spreads. Other work includes Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007),
who use the number of zero-return days as an illiquidity measure. Turnover and modified
turnover are used in many papers, including Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, Chacko,
and Mallik (2008). Although these heuristic measures provide quick estimates of illiquidity,
they do not perform well in gauging illiquidity compared to theoretically motivated measures
as shown by recent work such as Dick-Nielsen, Feldhtter, and Lando (2012).
Theoretical measures, as explained in Vayanos and Wang (2012), include price reversal,
which captures the transitory component of illiquidity, and price impact, which reflects both
the permanent and transitory components. An example of price reversal measures is the
minus autocovariance in Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011). This measure is shown to dominate
the bid-ask spread in measuring illiquidity.2 As for the other class of theoretical measures,
the price impact in Amihud (2002), defined as the price change per unit trade, has been
used in many studies. Other measures belonging to the price impact family include those in
Sadka (2006) and Glosten and Harris (1988). Recent work, such as Dick-Nielsen, Feldhtter,
and Lando (2012), reports that these theoretical measures dominate heuristic measures, such
as turnover, and the number of zero trading days, in gauging illiquidity. Although it is clear
that these theoretically motivated measures capture illiquidity better than heuristic measures
or bid-ask spreads, their relative performance of them is still debated.
Our first contribution is that we identify a set of illiquidity measures that can be shown
to be more robust than others. Specifically, we review existing measures as well as propose
new measures. The prior measures that we examine are the price reversal measure in Bao,
Pan, and Wang (2011) and the price reversal conditional on volume in Campbell, Grossman,
and Wang (1993). As for the price impact measures, we study a normalized price impact
measure based on that in Amihud (2002), and the coefficient of return regressed on signed
volume proposed in Vayanos and Wang (2012). Our proposed measures include the variance
ratio, developed in Lo and MacKinlay (1988), the residual volatility of returns, and the
mean-reversion coefficient of returns. We then compare their properties and their pricing
implications to arrive at a set of robust measures. With more confidence in measuring
2 Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) document that only a small fraction of this measure is implied by bid-ask
spreads.
18
2.1. INTRODUCTION
illiquidity, these findings should allow further studies on illiquidity in other contexts.
The second question is how illiquidity and illiquidity risk are connected to asset returns,
and more importantly whether it can explain the corporate yield spread puzzle. Corporate
bond yield spreads are higher than what can be explained by credit risk. Huang and Huang
(2003) and Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) examine this phenomenon and suggest
that other factors such as illiquidity may account for the yield spreads. To date, there is
no consensus on the role of illiquidity risk in the corporate spread puzzle. For example,
Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011) and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhtter, and Lando (2012) report that
illiquidity risk is priced in the corporate bond market. However, Bongaerts, De Jong, and
Driessen (2011) argue that the effect of illiquidity risk is small. Other related work on this
question includes Acharya and Pedersen (2005), who study illiquidity and illiquidity risk in
the stock market, and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010), who investigate this issue in
the corporate bond market.
Our second contribution is the finding that illiquidity level explains the yield spread
puzzle, while illiquidity risk is not priced except during the financial crisis. Specifically, we
estimate both existing illiquidity measures and our proposed measures using transaction-level
corporate bond data from 2002 to 2010. We then test the pricing implications of illiquidity
gauged by these measures and their risk in various specifications to reach this conclusion.
Our study can be summarized as follows. We first construct monthly estimates of
illiquidity level using heuristic measures, price reversal measures, price impact measures,
and other proposed measures. In estimation, we use bond trade data at the transaction-
level that spans a period of about eight years from 2002 to 2010. Among other measures
that we examined are the price reversal -y in Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), the regression
coefficient on returns on signed volume AVW,signed in Vayanos and Wang (2012), the variance
ratio VR, and the residual volatility o from bond returns modelled as an AR(p) process.
In a cross-sectional analysis, we find connections between illiquidity measures and bond
characteristics documented in the literature as proxies for illiquidity. As for their time-
series properties, we show that the time variations of these measures at the aggregate level
share a commonality as well as comove with market conditions. These results enable us to
confirm the validity of existing measures as well as our proposed measures in quantifying
illiquidity. We then address the second question of the pricing implications of illiquidity in
the corporate bond market. We show that corporate bond yield spreads are explained by
19
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most measures in our study both at the aggregate level and at the bond level, using the Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regressions of yield spreads on these measures at monthly frequency.3
Among all measures, we find that the residual volatility o, the variance ratio VR, and
the regression coefficient on returns on signed volume AVW,signed dominate other measures
in the pricing tests. Specifically, their estimated coefficients are statistically significant in
various specifications and also economically significant in most cases. We further test the
pricing implications of illiqudity risk associated with illiquidity level as gauged by each
measure. The results show that part of corporate bond yield spreads is due to illiquidity level,
while illiquidity risk explains yield spreads only during the crisis with negligible economic
significance.
This work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the problem of illiquidity
quantification and explains our proposed techniques for measuring illiquidity. Section 2.2
describes the data and gives summary statistics of our bond sample. Section 2.3 reviews
existing measures and explains how our proposed measures are constructed. In Section 2.4,
we report the cross-sectional and time-series properties of the measures.
Chapter 3 addresses the important question of how illiquidity and illiquidity risk are
related to corporate bond yield spreads. In Section 1, we examine how illiquidity level
explains yield spreads at the bond level. The pricing implcation of illiquidity risk is
investigated in Section 2. We then compare the performance of illiquidity level measures
and illiquidity risk measures in Section 3. Section 4 presents the relation between yield
spreads and illiquidity at the aggregate level. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Data Description and Summary Statistics
We obtain bond trade data from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine), which
is dissemination service of corporate bond trade information. It was initially created
by FINRA (The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) on July 1, 2002 to increase
transparency in the over-the-counter (OTC) corporate bond market by providing close to
real-time information to the public. FINRA requires firms to report information within 15
31n regression analysis of yield spreads on illiquidity measures in Chapter 3, we start from a baseline
that is controlled for bond characteristics, credit risk, and the underlying equity volatility. We then test
each measure one by one, and finally run a horse race of measures that are statistically significant in their
univariate regressions.
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minutes of transactions as of July 1, 2005.' TRACE was implemented in three phases and
reached full coverage in 2005 as described in FINRA (2011). In the first phase, the available
data mostly consist of large investment-grade 520 corporate bonds. The second phase, which
was completed on April 14, 2003, includes approximately 4,600 investment-grade bonds
and only 50 speculative-grade bonds. FINRA completed the last phase in February 2005,
enabling dissemination of 99% of all public transactions. The trade information we gather
from this database includes transaction price, quantity, and execution time. The par value
of a transaction is truncated at $5 million for investment-grade bonds and at $1 million for
speculative bonds.
In addition to this trade information, we collect issue information from Mergent FISD
(Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database). This dataset includes bond rating, offering
date, offering amount, coupon, and bond maturity. Bonds may be rated at different times
and by multiple credit rating agencies, which are Moody's, S&P (Standard and Poor's), and
Fitch. We take the average of these reported ratings to use as the bond rating.
Stock and other data are also needed in our study. We obtain stock data from CRSP
(The Center of Research in Security Prices). Other data that we use include interest rates
from the Federal Reserve Bank, and market indices from Datastream (Thomson Reuters) and
CBOE (The Chicago Board Options Exchange). Their details will be described in Section
2.4.2, where we use these data in our analysis.
Our pre-sample consists of bonds from July 2002 to December 2010. This duration of
7.5 years can be partitioned into three periods: Pre-Crisis, Crisis, and Post-Crisis, using the
business cycle expansions and contractions announced by NBER (The National Bureau of
Economic Research). In cleaning the data, we remove transactions with non-regular sale
conditions or with special prices. We then correct the data for cancelled and corrected
transactions. Lastly, we exclude repeated inter-dealer transactions and transactions with
misreported prices or yields. After cleaning the data, we apply the following filters to arrive
at our sample. First, we keep only bonds that are traded for one year or longer to avoid
bonds that are present for only few months in the sample. Second, we require that bonds are
traded for at least 75% of their trading days to avoid bonds with no trading activity during
part of their time in the sample period. Third, we restrict our sample to only investment-
grade bonds determined by their ratings in each period. Fourth, the included bonds must
4At the beginning, in 2002, the reporting requirement was 75 minutes.
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have at least five transactions per day and 10 transactions per month to allow adequate
accuracy in estimation. Lastly, we drop the three-month period before bond maturity to
avoid the Brownian bridge of price.
We give summary statistics of our sample from July 2002 to December 2010 in Table
2.1. There is a total of 907 bonds, and approximately 500 bonds reside in each period. The
rating median for our sample is Al before the crisis, which degrades slightly to A2 in the two
following periods. As for the issuance size, our bonds are fairly large. Their median issuance
size is one billion dollars. The median age of bonds in the sample stays relatively constant
at two years across the entire sample period. So does the median time to maturity, which is
approximately six years. On average, a bond in the sample is traded for more than five years
in the Pre-Crisis and Crisis periods, while this trading length is shorter in the Post-Crisis
period. The average trading frequency and turnover are higher during the subprime crisis
and after, compared to the time before the onset of the crisis.5 On the other hand, the
average trade size is smaller in the Crisis period. These two observations imply that traders
break their trades into smaller sizes and trade more often during the crisis.
51n Section 2.4, we show that the number of trades per month may be used as a heuristic measure of
illiquidity and is correlated with some theoretical measures.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Bond Sample
This table reports summary statistics of the sample of 907 bonds by period. Rating is a numerical
is the percentage of issuance traded per month.
translation with AAA=1 and D=22. Turnover
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
Jul 2002 - Nov 2007 Dec 2007 - Jun 2009 Jul 2009 - Dec 2010
Median Mean Std. Median Mean Std. Median Mean Std.
#Bonds 442 461 504
Issuance (106$) 1,000 1,170 1,043 1,000 1,259 1,278 1,000 1,199 1,216
Rating (AAA=1, D=22) 5.15 5.30 1.94 6.00 6.19 1.93 6.17 6.93 1.93
Age (yr) 2.19 2.54 2.06 2.35 3.20 2.71 1.94 2.64 2.41
Maturity (yr) 5.13 7.33 6.84 6.17 8.62 8.13 5.93 8.44 7.93
Coupon (%) 5.50 5.49 1.28 5.55 5.63 0.99 5.65 5.70 1.45
Years traded (yr) 5.19 5.79 1.91 4.64 5.22 1.97 3.05 3.61 2.20
Turnover (% of iss./month) 8.22 10.43 7.16 6.07 7.38 4.80 6.87 9.15 7.57
Trd Size (103$, monthly) 442 587 486 214 318 343 285 420 414
#Trades (per month) 159 198 108 274 371 304 199 281 233
Price 100.74 102.31 5.67 99.18 98.52 5.29 105.78 106.87 5.92
C)
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2.3 Measures of Illiquidity Level
Illiquidity is a result of market frictions and has a transitory impact on asset prices. In
this section, we explore various illiquidity measures in the literature and propose a few new
measures. They can be categorized into four families: 1) heuristic measures, 2) price reversal
measures, 3) price impact measures, and 4) other measures.
Heuristic measures are often based on observed bond characteristics such as age and
maturity. Section 2.3.1 discusses related work and outlines the definitions of heuristic
measures in our study.
Besides heuristic measures, most of the theoretically motivated illiquidity measures can
be classified into two categories: price reversal -y and price impact A. According to Vayanos
and Wang (2012), A captures both the permanent component (caused by trade information)
and the transitory component (caused by risk aversion of liquidity suppliers) of trade impact.
On the other hand, -y measures only the transitory part. Examples of A and related measures
are the return per volume of Amihud (2002) and the coefficient of return regression on signed
volume of Vayanos and Wang (2012). Measures related to -y include the bid-ask spread in Roll
(1984), the minus covariance in Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), the price reversal conditional
on signed volume in Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), and the estimated transaction
costs in Hasbrouck (2009).
Besides the A and -y measures, we propose three new measures of illiquidity. The first
is the RMSE (Root Mean Squared Error) of an order-p autoregressive model or AR(p) of
demeaned returns. The second is the minus sum of AR(p) coefficients estimated in the
former model. The last is the variance ratio (VR), introduced by Lo and MacKinlay (1988)
and examined in Richardson and Stock (1989).
To facilitate the discussion of measures in subsequent subsections, we introduce the
following notation for common variables of interest. For transaction t,
log price, pt = ln(clean price)
log return, rt A Apt = pt - pt-1
Signed volume, Vt, is the par value volume in $. The sign is positive if the dealer buys
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bonds from the client and negative otherwise. 6
Unsigned volume, |Vl, is the par value volume in $.
Average volume, V, is the average of daily unsigned volume in the sample period (includes
only traded days) in $
Issuance size, I in $
2.3.1 Heuristic Measures
Researchers and practitioners have used bond characteristics and trading activity variables
as proxies for bond illiquidity. While these heuristic measures do not directly quantify
illiquidity and may be outperformed by theoretically motivated measures, they have some
links to theoretical measures, as will be shown in Section 2.4.1. Popular heuristic measures
include age, maturity, issuance size, coupon, rating, turnover, trade size, and number of
trades.
An example of prior work using bond characteristics is Campbell and Taksler (2003).
They control for cross-sectional liquidity differences, using issuance size, maturity, and
coupon rate7 in studying the relation between corporate bond yield spreads and equity
volatility. Of these three bond characteristics, they find maturity and coupon rate to
be important control variables. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use coupon, issuance
size, age, maturity, and a rating dummy as illiquidity proxies to explain the nondefault
component of corporate bond yield spreads. Significant variables are issuance size, maturity,
and the rating dummy. According to them, the rating dummy represents "flight-quality"
or "flight-to-liquidity" rather than liquidity level itself. We will show later that some bond
characteristics are connected with theoretical measures in Section 2.4.1. For example, older
bonds are associated with higher illiquidity as gauged by theoretically motivated measures.
Trading activity variables have also been used extensively in the literature as illiquidity
proxies. One of the illiquidity measures in Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) is the percentage
of zero returns. They report that this illiquidity proxy is a significant variable in explaining
corporate bond yield spreads. Covitz and Downing (2007) use the number of trades at
'Inter-dealer trades are excluded when we estimate signed measures.
7 Taxes are higher for bonds with higher coupon rates.
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maturity as a liquidity proxy and show that it explains the yield spreads of very short-term
commercial papers. Other variables include the weighted turnover in Mahanti, Nashikkar,
Subrahmanyam, Chacko, and Mallik (2008). These trading activity measures are weakly
connected with theoretical measures as will be shown in later sections.
In this work, we include the following heuristic measures, study their relations with other
theoretical measures, as well as use them as control variables in pricing tests.
Age = How long bond has lived (in years)
Maturity Time to maturity (in years)
Issuance Par value of debt initially issued ($)
Turnover Percentage of issuance traded in a month (%)
Trd Size Par value volume ($)
Num Trds = Number of trades in a month
2.3.2 Price Reversal -y and Variants
We assume that the log price pt has two components. The permanent component, ft, is the
fundamental value of the bond, which follows a random walk. The transitory component,
Xt, is caused by illiquidity and is uncorrelated with ft.
(2.1)
(2.2)
P = ft + Xt
ft = ft-1 + et,
where et is shock of the random walk. The return is then
rt = Pt - Pt-1
= qt + et, (2.3)
where qt is the difference in the transitory component of price. This model is assumed for
construction of illiquidity measures in 2.3.2 and 2.3.2, and again in 2.3.4 and 2.3.4.
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Bid-Ask Spread
The bid-ask spread is one of the earliest illiquidity measures. Its connection with illiquidity
has both theoretical and empirical grounds. In the theory literature, Stoll (1978) and Ho
and Stoll (1981) are among the first to establish links between the bid-ask spread and market
frictions. Stoll (1978) shows that market makers raise bid-ask spreads because of holding
costs and order costs. Moreover, they also increase the bid-ask spread to compensate for
their losses with information traders. Ho and Stoll (1981) derive an expression of the bid-ask
spread that maximizes the dealer's expected utility, and conclude that the dealer widens the
bid-ask spread due to a number of factors, including his risk aversion and the asset return
variance. In addition, bid-ask spreads in the OTC market are shown to be larger than those
in the exchange market in Ho and Stoll (1983).
On the empirical side, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) reason that illiquidity should
explain asset returns. They use the bid-ask spread to measure illiquidity and show that it is
a significant determinant of stock returns, using the data from 1960-1980. Bid-ask spreads
have been used as an illiquidity proxy in many studies, including Brockman, Chung, and
Prignon (2009), who investigate the relation between firm liquidity and exchange liquidity.
Among others, Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) and Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
include the bid-ask spread as one of illiquidity proxies in studying the relation between
illiquidity and yield spreads.
The bid-ask spread is related to some heuristic measures. Specifically, the spread is larger
for smaller trades as reported in Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007). It is shown in Chen,
Lesmond, and Wei (2007) that the bid-ask spread size can be explained by the number of
zero returns at an adjusted R 2 around 7%.
There are two shortcomings in measuring illiquidity with bid-ask spreads. First, bid-ask
quote data, unlike prices, may not be available. A number of techniques have been proposed
to work around this problem. In a simple price model, Roll (1984) shows that the bid-ask
spread can be estimated from autocovariance with the following relation:
s = 2 /-Cov(rtrt_1), (2.4)
where s is the bid-ask estimate and Cov(rt, rt_1) is the first lag autocovariance of returns.
However, Harris (1990) later argues that this approach results in noisy estimates of the bid-
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ask spread in daily or weekly data and biased estimates in small samples. Hasbrouck (2009)
proposes a way to estimate bid-ask spreads or transaction costs using Gibbs sampling, and
reports that these estimates are close to actual data. This technique has been used in recent
work, including Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen (2011).
Although recent techniques and increasing computing power allow for more accurate
estimation of the bid-ask spread from price data, the bid-ask spread is not an accurate
measure of illiquidity. Specifically, Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) show that the bid-ask spread
accounts for a tiny fraction of a theoretically motivated measure called minus autocovariance
-y, introduced in Section 2.3.2.
Minus Autocovariance
The minus autocovariance of returns y is linked to illiquidity both in the theoretical and
empirical literature. In this section, we define the measure y, analyze its dynamics, and
explain why the illiquidity, as measured by 7, is much greater than the bid-ask bounce.
On the theory side, Huang and Wang (2009) show that the transitory effect of illiquidity
gives rise to the negative serial correlation in returns, and this effect is higher on negative
returns. The price reversal -y, which captures the transitory component of price changes, is
analyzed in Vayanos and Wang (2012) for its relations to various market frictions. In an
earlier version of the paper, they demonstrate that the minus autocovariance -y increases with
higher participation costs, transaction costs, and leverage constraints, while its relation with
other types of imperfections can be either positive or negative. In the empirical literature,
Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) estimate -y for a corporate bond sample, and show that it is
a robust measure of illiquidity that comoves with market conditions at the aggregate level.
In addition, they report that illiquidity, as measured by -y, is an important determinant of
corporate yield spreads.
Using the model outlined in (2.1)-(2.3), we define -y in the same manner as in Bao, Pan,
and Wang (2011). We use the minus of the autocovariance rather than the autocovariance
because the returns are negatively correlated:
7 = - Cov (rt, rt_-1), (2.5)
where rt denotes the return of transaction t. To understand how y is influenced by the
transitory component of price qt, we explore two cases of qt dynamics. First, we consider
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a simple scenario where qt is modelled as an autoregressive process of order one or AR(1).
Then, we consider a more general case of qt following an AR(p) process8 .
Suppose the transitory component of returns is an AR(1) process with coefficient pi and
homoskedastic uncorrelated shock et. The magnitude of p1 determines the persistence of
the transitory component. This quantity represents the long-term part of illiquidty. On the
other hand, the volatility of et represents the short-term part of illiquidity.
q= plqt-i + Et. (2.6)
We can show that
y = -Cov(rt, rt- 1)
-Cov(qt, qt-)
-p1Var(qt,, qt-1)
2
7 = -Pi 1 ,where a is the variance of qt shock. (2.7)
From (2.7), -y combines both the long-term and short-term aspects of illiquidity. The
magnitude of -y increases when the instantaneous volatility of the transitory component
goes up. In general, it also increases with the persistence coefficient.
We now consider a more general case of the transitory component of returns, where qt is
an AR(p) process. The coefficient of lag r is denoted by pr, and the shock is denoted by ct.
qt = p1qt-i1 + p2qt-2 + ... + Ppqt-p + Ct. (2.8)
We can show that
l= -Cov(rt, rt_1)
-Cov(q,qti)
-Cov(pqti-1 + P2qt-2 + ... + ppqt-, qt-1)
- { p1Cov(q-1, qt-) + p2 Cov(qt- 2 , qt-1) + . . . + ppCov(qtp, qt-i1)}. (2.9)
8 Any autoregressive and moving average process of order (p,q) or ARMA(p,q) can be expressed as an
AR(p) process.
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With a few steps of algebriac manipulation, it follows that
P1 + P3P2 + P4P3 + + PpPp-1 02
7 _ = . (2.10)1 - [P2 + P3(P1 + P3) + P4(2 + P4) +...+ Pp(p-2 + Pp)] (
Ep1
By the model assumption, |pr| < 1. Empirical evidence indicates that ppr < 1 for s #r
and s, r 1. We can approximate the measure as follows:
Pi
1-~~ P2IT~
po=1
By further dropping the second order term in the shock variance quantity,
P~ o2 (2.11)
1P2f
This analysis allows us to gauge the impact of the transitory dynamics on illiquidity as
measured by 7. In addition to the first lag coefficient, the longer lag coefficients, especially
the second one, also affect -y. Specifically, -y decreases as the ratio of P2 to P1 goes up. This
relation can be seen in two ways. As the relative size of P2 and pi is closer to one, the
transitory component, considered during a short interval, becomes smaller. In this scenario,
P2 also partially cancels the effect of p1 more.
One important question is whether this autocovariance measure y is a mere reflection of
the bid-ask bounce. A connection between y and bid-ask spreads is studied in Roll (1984).
In this work, the price model consists of a fundamental ft and noise xt. The fundamental ft
is a random walk, and the noise xt, generated by bid-ask sequences, is i.i.d.
Pt = ft + Xt (2.12)
xt = -sign(Vt), (2.13)
where s is the percentage bid-ask spread, and sign(Vt) is -1 when the dealer sells a security
and 1 when the dealer buys the security. Without the presence of any market frictions, Roll
(1984) shows that
7 -Cov(rt, rt_1) (2.14)
y= () (2.15)
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Despite the relation between -y and bid-ask spreads in (2.15) derived in the simplied model,
Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) show that -y captures much more than the effect of the bid-ask
bounce. They estimate implied -y from bid-ask spread quotes for a corporate bond sample,
and find that these estimates are only a small fraction of -y estimated from bond returns.
Price Reversal Conditional on Normalized Volume
To distinguish liquidity trades from informational trades, we include the price reversal
conditional on volume proposed in Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993). There is
evidence showing that a high volume is usually followed by rising prices more often than
falling prices in the stock market. Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) provide further
empirical evidence that a negative serial correlation in stock returns is more pronounced
with a high volume, and explain this finding with a theoretical model. They point out that
noninformational or liquidity trades are associated with a large volume, while this is not the
case for informational trades. They explain that market makers demand higher expected
future returns in order to accommodate selling pressure from liquidity traders.
With this idea, we use the price reversal conditional on normalized volume defined as
follows:
rt+ a + ( + CGW(2.16)
where y is the first autocorrelation of returns, and -yCGW is the regression coefficient of
returns on its first lag conditional on accompanied normalized volume. |Vt| denotes the par
value volume of transaction t, and V denotes the average daily par value volume. a is the
regression constant, which is not important for our study.
Furthermore, we take advantage of the signed volume data available during the last two
years of the sample, and estimate the signed conditional price reversal -yCGWsigned. The
regression used to estimate -CGWsigned is similar to 7yCGW with the substitution of the signed
volume:
CWsged V
rt+i = a + (71 + 7GWsign =)rt, (2.17)V
where V is negative if market makers buy bonds from clients and positive if market makers
sell bonds to clients. Inter-dealer trades are excluded in estimating this measure.
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2.3.3 Price Impact A and Variants
While the price reversal - captures the transitory component of the price change, the price
impact A captures both the permanent and transitory components, as shown in Vayanos and
Wang (2012). Therefore, in theory, A should provide a better estimate of illiquidity, compared
to -y. In this section, we review some related work, and introduce two price impact measures.
As a side note, we do not rely on the price model assumptions in Section 2.3.2 for these price
impact measures.
One of earliest studies estimating both parts of market frictions is Glosten and Harris
(1988). Using NYSE stock data from 1981-1983, they propose an econometric model that
separates the bid-ask spread into the component due to asymmetric information, or the
permanent component, and the component due to inventory and order costs, or the transitory
component. They find that in addition to inventory and processing costs, illiquidity is
also caused by asymmetric information. More recently, Sadka (2006) builds on this model
and concludes that part of momentum and post-earnings-annoucement returns is due to
informational trades.
One of the most widely used measures is the Amihud price impact. Amihud (2002)
proposes an illiquidity measure that does not require microstructure data such as bid-ask
spreads. This measure is defined as the price change per unit volume. Using this measure,
he reports that illiquidity explains excess returns in the stock market. Closely related to the
Amihud measure, one of our proposed measures is explained in Section 2.3.3.
Normalized Amihud Price Impact A'
We propose a normalized price impact based on that in Amihud (2002), with a slight
modification. This adjustment is due to an observation that larger bonds having the same
value of price change per unit volume as smaller bonds should be considered more illiquid.
The measure is defined as the price movement per normalized trade size. We estimate
monthly normalized price impact A' using daily price impact and transaction-level price
impact.
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Normalized price impact of transaction t,
,1 _Pt - Pt-1 (2.18)
t/
where pt is the log return of transaction t, V is the par value volume of the transaction in
$, and I is the issuance size of the bond in $.
Normalized price impact of day d,
d -N At, where Nd is the number of transactions day d. (2.19)
tE day d
Monthly estimate of normalized price impact,
AI'= 1 S AI, where Nm is the number of traded days in a monthm. (2.20)
m dE month m
Coefficient of Return Regression on Signed Volume AVW,signed
The other price impact in our study is that proposed in Vayanos and Wang (2012). It is
the regression coefficient of the return on the normalized signed volume. In other words, it
represents the sensitivity of the return to buy and sell demands conditional on volume. This
price impact AvW is estimated from the following regression:
'rt = 0Z+ AVW'Signed (221
where AVW,signed is the regression coefficient. V denotes the average daily par value volume.
V denotes the signed par value volume of transaction t. V is positive when investors sell
bonds to market makers, and negative when investors buy bonds from market makers. Inter-
dealer trades are excluded in this estimation. Since the signed volume data are available only
from November 2008 to December 2010, the estimated signed measures, AVW,signed as well
as -yCGWsigned introduced in Section 2.3.2, are based on shorter period of data. Despite the
limitation in sample length, we are still able to show statistical significance of this measure
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in pricing tests to be covered in subsequent sections. This evidence tells us that Avwsigned
is a strong illiquidity measure.
In their theoretical model, Vayanos and Wang (2012) show that this measure increases
with greater volatility of the asset, greater risk aversion of the investor, and a lower number
of market makers (or liquidity suppliers). Avw,signed is also shown to capture illiquidity better
than price reversal measures.
2.3.4 Other Measures
In this section, we introduce three measures of illiquidity that do not fall into the price
reversal or price impact categories. We briefly review the related literature and motivations
behind them. These measures are the variance ratio, the residual volatility of the return
transitory component, and the residual volatility of the total return. The price model in
Section 2.3.2 is assumed.
Variance Ratio
The variance ratio proposed by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) is initially used to test the random
walk hypothesis of stock prices.9 The variance ratio at horizon r or VR(r) is defined as
follows:
VR(r) = VarErt(w)] (2.22)
-rVar[rt(1)]'
where -r is the number of trading days, and rt(r) is the r-day return. In our estimation,
we use a horizon of 120 days or T = 120. Var[rt(r)] denotes the variance of the T-day
return. They show that when Cov(rt, rti) ~ 0 as -r -+ oo, the variance ratio approaches
the asymptotic value in (2.23):
VR(r) -+ 1 - .qt (2.23)Var[rt]
9A number of studies extend the original variance ratio statistic such as Ronen (1997) and Andersen,
Bollerslev, and Das (2001).
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If the return were a random walk, the variance ratio would be 1 at all horizons. However,
because of correlations among return lags, the variance ratio is less than 1. We observe that
the variance ratio reaches the steady-state limit more slowly during financial distress as
shown in Figure 2.2. Based on this fact, we use the variance ratio estimates at a given
horizon as an illiquidity measure. One would expect that an illiquid bond would have a
higher variance ratio than a liquid bond at a horizon before their steady-state values.
We are aware of the possibility of biased estimates in the variance ratio by using
overlapping observations as opposed to nonoverlapping observations as pointed out in
Richardson and Stock (1989). However, our sample period is not long enough to allow
us to use nonoverlapping observations. Figure 2.3 shows that the variance ratio estimates
from nonoverlapping observations can be non-monotonically decreasing with the horizon.
With this limitation, we use overlapping observations in our estimation.
Based on the asymptotics of the variance ratio in (2.23), we can deduce the relative size of
the transitory component and the fundamental component. For the sample, the transitory
component variance is about nine times larger than that of the fundamental component.
This value translates to approximately threefold volatility.
RMSE of Transitory Component Decomposed by Kalman Filter
With the price model in (2.1)-(2.3), we examine the possibility of using the Kalman filter in
Kalman (1960) to decompose the return into two components. This decomposition will allow
us to estimate the residual volatility of the transitory component and that of the permanent
component. In this setting, the observed return is the measurement equation (2.24), and
the unobserved transitory component is the state equation (2.25). We make an additional
assumption that the transitory component can be captured as an AR(p) process.
rt = qt + et, (2.24)
where qt is the transitory component of returns, and et is the random walk increment of the
fundamental.
P
qt = I psqt-s + et, (2.25)
U=1
where p, is the correlation coefficient of lag s, and et is the noise of the transitory component.
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To check the feasibility of this approach, we perform Monte Carlo simulations in a
practical setting. The fundamental noise et and the transitory noise Et are specified to be
normally distributed with time varying variances , and 0,,, respectively. In addition,
these two noises are correlated with time varying correlation coefficient peE,t.' 0 With these
parameters, the two noises are drawn from the distribution in (2.26).
[t] _ N [01 F - ,t~~ eE,t0*e,t0'f,t1\
Et~ ~ 0 Pe,27~~i 0 -2 (2.26)
It turns out that this approach is not practical for our estimation. To acheive accuracy
within 10% of the true value, one would need at least approximately 5,000 observations as
shown in Figure 2.4. However, the bonds in our sample have on average about 200-370 trades
per month, depending on the period. Although we can not estimate the residual volatility
of the transitory component of returns, we can approximate it by estimating the residual
volatility of the total return because the size of the transitory component1 ' is about three
times larger than that of the fundamental component, as implied by the variance ratio. We
explain the residual volatility estimation of the total returns in Section 2.3.4.
RMSE and Minus Mean-Reversion Coefficient of Total Return
To distinguish the short-term illiquidity from the long-term illiquidity in returns, we propose
an approach that allows for estimates of these two parts. For each bond, we model the return
time series with an AR(p) process in (2.27):
rd = 1 + r_+ + Vt, (2.27)
where rd is the demeaned return of transaction t, 4, is the correlation coefficient of lag s,
and ut is the model error. The minus sum of all lag coefficients tells us how mean-reverting
the return is. Thus, the magnitude of this sum should be higher for more liquid bonds. We
'
0 For each replication in the Monte Carlo simulations, parameters 0e,t, o-,t, and pe,,t are first drawn from
their normal distributions. Then, the fundamental noise et and the transitory noise Et are drawn from the
normal distribution in (2.26) with these parameters.
"As measured by volatility.
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denote this long-term illiquidity estimate as <b. In contrast, the volatility model error vt is
the instantaneous deviation of the return.
In estimation, we determine the number of lags with AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)
and BIC (Bayesian/Schwartz Information Criterion). Using transactional-level data, we find
that the optimal number of lags is about four for bonds in our sample, and the R 2 is around
20%. With this choice, we estimate the two measures in the following regression:
r = ^1ri_1 + # 2^r_ 2 + ^3rt- 3 + 4ri_4 + yt, (2.28)
where 0, is the estimated correlation coefficient of lag s, and yt is the residual from estimation.
We then collect the correlation coefficient estimates 0, and the residuals qt for each month
and define the two measures as follows.
Minus sum of mean-reversion coefficients,
-(01 + 2 + 0^3 + 04) (2.29)
Residual volatility,
Nma.. 2, (2.30)
mtE month m
where Nm is the number of observations in a month.
2.3.5 Summary Statistics and Correlations
Using transaction-level data, we estimate monthly illiquidity measures and report their
summary statistics in Table 2.2. The sample period is specified in each panel for most
measures, except the two signed measures whose sample period is available from November
2008 onwards. All of the measure estimates have statistically signficant means. 'yCGWsigned
is the exception due to a shorter sample period. Most of the estimates show an increase in
illiquidity level during the crisis.
For example, the average of price reversal -y increases more than twice as much, from 0.45
in the Non-Crisis period to 0.96 in the Crisis period. The price impact A average almost
3T
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doubles in the Crisis period, while the signed price impact AVWsigned average increases more
than two times as much as its average during the normal time. Similarly, our proposed
measures <b and o- have a statistically significant difference between normal times and the
financial crisis. The <b average goes down from 1.54 to 1.42, signifying that bond returns
are less mean-reverting during the Crisis. The increase in a, in the Crisis period shows that
the short-term illiquidity is larger. Of all the measures, the variance ratio VR shows the
least change between regimes. Its average goes up by 0.01 during the Crisis Period, and the
difference between periods is statistically indistinguishable.
We study correlations among all the measures and report them in Table 2.3. With
these results, we can see some connections between measure families. The price reversal -y
is moderately correlated with those in the price impact family. For example, the correlation
between -y and A' is 0.44, and that between -y and AVWsigned is 0.22. In addition, the price
reversal y is highly correlated with the residual volatility a, which can be expected from
(2.7). This high correlation indicates that much of the short-term illiquidity is due to the
transitory component in returns. The residual volatility also correlates with the measures
in the price impact family. On the contary, the mean-reversion measure <1 and the variance
ratio VR seem to be orthogonal with other measures, showing little correlation.
Within the price reversal family, there is a weak correlation between -y and YCGW
7CGWsigned does not comove with -y and -yCGw. This observation implies that volume is
an important factor that separates these three measures. As for the price impact family,
AVW,signed and A' overlap slightly. The other three measures 0 ., <b, and VR are slightly
correlated although they are constructed from different bases.
As far as heuristic measures are concerned, a subset of them show small but statistically
significant correlations with theoretically motivated measures. For example, ln(TrdSize)
and ln(NumTrds) are slightly correlated with -y, with correlations of -0.14 and 0.09,
respectively. Maturity is the best heuristic measure, with a correlation of 0.47 with -y and
with a correlation of 0.49 with or. Age, on the other hand, does not correlate with the
theoretical measures except the variance ratios. These results imply that some of bond
characteristics and trading variables measure illiquidity to some extent.
Within the heuristic measure family, bond characteristics and trading activity quantities
exhibit some correlations. For example, older bonds have lower turnovers and their trades
occur at smaller sizes. The three heuristic measures of trading activity are connected. For
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example, ln(NumTrds) has a correlation of -0.20 with ln(TrdsSize). This statistic implies
that an increasing number of trades for a bond occur at smaller trade sizes. turnover has
correlations of 0.55 with ln(TrdSize) and of 0.24 with lin(NumTrds), respectively. This
evidence implies that we would need only one of the three trading activity measures when
performing subsequent analyses to avoid multicolinearity.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Illiquidity Level Measures
This table reports statistics of time-serial means of illiquidity level monthly estimates for the 907 bonds in the sample. The sample period is
defined in each panel except for the signed measures whose data are available from November 2008 onwards. The robust t-statistics for means in
brackets account for cross-sectional and serial correlations. Top and bottom 0.5% of illiquidity level estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom
1% of monthly yield spreads and associated measure estimates are trimmed.
Panel A: Full Sample (July 2002 - December 2010)
CGW CGW,signed AI AVWsigned 1VR
(x10 3 ) (x10- 3 )
Mean 0.56 0.33 0.03 0.81 6.87 1.51 0.90 0.09
Std. Dev. 0.46 0.35 0.38 0.85 8.94 0.19 0.39 0.08
95% C.I. (0.49, 0.64) (0.28, 0.38) (-0.00, 0.06) (0.66, 0.95) (4.28, 9.47) (1.47, 1.55) (0.83, 0.97) (0.08, 0.11)
Robust t-stat [14.67] [13.29] [1.86] [11.00] [5.20] [75.87] [24.73] [12.96]
95th 1.50 0.96 0.48 2.56 21.85 1.75 1.64 0.26
Median 0.44 0.26 0.03 0.51 4.28 1.54 0.84 0.07
5th 0.09 -0.08 -0.41 0.10 0.23 1.16 0.40 0.02
Panel B: Non-Crisis (July 2002 - November 2007 and July 2009 - December 2010)
.. CGW CGWsigned A, I VWsigned .1, VR
(x10 3 ) (x10- 3 )
Mean 0.45 0.38 0.01 0.69 4.90 1.54 0.78 0.09
Std. Dev. 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.72 5.98 0.20 0.33 0.08
95% C.I. (0.41, 0.48) (0.33, 0.43) (-0.05, 0.07) (0.59, 0.79) (3.91, 5.89) (1.48, 1.60) (0.75, 0.82) (0.08, 0.10)
Robust t-stat [28.14] [16.04] [0.40] [13.17] [9.70] [50.41) [39.91] [14.14]
95th 1.29 1.05 0.45 2.19 17.79 1.78 1.44 0.25
Median 0.34 0.32 0.00 0.45 3.04 1.58 0.74 0.07
5th 0.08 -0.05 -0.45 0.09 0.11 1.15 0.36 0.02
Panel C: Crisis (December 2007 - June 2009)
CGW CGWsigned AI AVWsigned (I> 0' VR
(x10 3 ) (x10- 3 )
Mean 0.95 0.13 0.05 1.29 10.95 1.42 1.29 0.10
Std. Dev. 0.65 0.32 0.53 1.24 12.70 0.15 0.47 0.07
95% C.I. (0.86, 1.03) (0.07, 0.18) (0.00, 0.10) (1.01, 1.56) (9.00, 12.90) (1.39, 1.45) (1.21, 1.36) (0.08, 0.12)
Robust t-stat [21.35] [4.34] [1.99] [9.21] [11.03] [103.10] [32.91] [9.54]
95th 2.41 0.59 0.65 4.07 34.83 1.64 2.15 0.26
Median 0.80 0.12 0.06 0.83 7.37 1.44 1.24 0.07
5th 0.19 -0.33 -0.53 0.21 0.26 1.14 0.61 0.03
0
]0
Table 2.3: Correlation Matrix of Illiquidity Level Measures
The sample period is from July 2002 to December 2010 (except those signed measures whose data are from November 2008 to December 2010).
P-values are shown in parentheses. Correlations with statistical significance of at least 5% level are boldfaced. Top and bottom 0.5% of illiquidity
level estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1% of monthly yield spreads and associated measure estimates are trimmed.
CGW .,,CGWsigned AI \VWsigned D CT VR Age Maturity Turnover ln(Trd Size) In(Nm Trds) YE
7y 1.00
.CGW 
-0.10 1.00
(0.00)
fCGWsigned 0.04 0.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.74)
A' 0.44 0.05 0.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.92)
AVw,signed 0.23 -0.03 0.07 0.15 1.00
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
0.02 0.14 0.02 0.00 -0.02 1.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.14) (0.69) (0.05)
Oru 0.90 -0.15 0.03 0.49 0.27 -0.17 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VR 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.05 -0.12 0.18 1.00
(0.00) (0.47) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.21 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Maturity 0.47 -0.04 0.02 0.24 0.05 -0.11 0.49 0.32 -0.25 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Turnover 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.14 -0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.22 -0.34 0.17 1.00
(0.26) (0.81) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln(Trd Size) -0.14 0.11 -0.01 -0.06 -0.38 0.03 -0.18 0.17 -0.43 0.17 0.55 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln(Nm Trds) 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.31 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.03 -0.01 0.24 -0.20 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
E -36 -0.14 0.05 0.23 0.18 -0.21 0.46 0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 0.26 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.28) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00)
C)
Ci
(017
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2.4 Properties of Illiquidity Level Measures
To better understand the nature of illiquidity measures, we study their properties in two
ways. First, we examine their cross-sectional relations with bond characteristics. Then, we
look at their connections with market conditions.
2.4.1 Illiquidity and Bond Characteristics
In studying how illiquidity measures are related to bond characteristics, we run the following
pooled regressions for each measure. Monthly illiquidity measures are estimated using
transaction-level data.
Lit= a + bjcharit + Eit, (2.31)
where the subscript it denotes bond i in month t. Li denotes the illiquidity estimate of bond
i in month t, and bj denotes the regression coefficient on bond characteristic j abbreviated
as chari.
We report the results of this analysis in Table 2.4. The results are based on the full
sample period for unsigned measures in Panel A. We can see that bond characteristics are
important explanatory variables of illiquidity measures in most cases with R 2 of 20% or more.
Panel B shows the results of the signed measures whose sample starts in November 2008.
Consequently, some coefficient estimates for the signed measures are statistically insignificant
although they may be significant with a longer sample. The low R 2 values for these signed
measures are probably due to this fact as well.
There are five commonalities in the relations of illiquidity measures and bond charac-
teristics. First, young bonds are more liquid than old bonds. This trend is consistent with
the findings in Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) and Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007). This
observation is true for all illiquidity measures except VR. For example, a bond aging one
more year has an increase of 0.01 in its -y, 60 in its A,, and 0.02 in its o,,. These increases
are equivalent to 2%, 7%, and 2% of their full sample averages, respectively. Therefore, the
A measures tend to be more sentitive with age than those in other families.
Second, a similar relation also holds for bond maturity. Bonds with longer time to
maturity tend to be less liquid. Roughly, a bond with one year longer time to maturity sees
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an increase of 0.05, 40, and 0.04 in its y, V, and a, respectively. These changes account
for approximately 9%, 5%, and 4% of these three measure averages, respectively. Hence,
cross-sectional variation in -y and or are more associated with age than maturity. However,
the opposite is true for the A family. Maturity also explains cross-sectional differences in
other measures. For instance, bonds with one-year longer maturity, on average, have a <1 of
0.006 less and a -CGW of 0.01 less.
Third, the bond size also has mixed connections with illiquidity measures. For some
measures (Y,7 CGW 1CGWsigned, and a,), bonds with larger issuances are more liquid. For
others, the issuance size does not have a significant relation to illiquidity or has the opposite
connection.
Fourth, bonds with lower ratings are sometimes more illiquid, depending on the measures
considered. This relation holds for -yCGW, <b, or, and VR. However, ratings have no effect on
other measures.
Lastly, bonds with higher turnover are more liquid, and bonds with a higher number of
trades per month are less liquid. The former is intuitive. The latter can be explained by our
observations about the number of trades and the trade size in previous sections. Table 2.3
reports a negative correlation between the number of trades and trade size. In addition, the
number of trades is the highest while the trade size is the smallest during the Crisis period
as shown in Table 2.2. These two facts imply that investors may break their big trades into
smaller ones and trade more often during illiquid times.
Given these statistically significant relations with illiquidity measures, there are grounds
for using some bond characteristics and trading activity quantities as illiquidity proxies. This
observation is particularly true for age, maturity, turnover, and number of trades.
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Table 2.4: Cross-sectional Variation in Measures and Bond Characteristics
This table reports pooled regressions of measures on bond charactersitics. T-statistics in brackets account
for cross-sectional and serial correlations. The data are from July 2002 to December 2010 except the
signed measures, whose period is from November 2008 to December 2010.
Panel A: Full Sample (July 2002 - December 2010)
-y
Intercept 0.52
[2.45]
Age 0.01
[2.62
Maturity 0.05
[13.45]
ln(Issuance) -0.06
[-2.10]
Rating 0.01
[1.42]
Turnover
ln(Num Trds)
Obs
R 2(%)
0.61
[2.92]
0.00
[1.08]
0.05
[13.46]
-0.06
[-2.36]
0.01
[1.86]
-0.01
[-3.41]
0.19
[0.95]
0.01
[2.16]
0.05
[14.00]
-0.11
[-3.88]
0.01
[0.81]
0.14
[8.33]
22,046 22,046 22,046
22.82 23.35 24.35
A(
(X 103 )
-0.97
[-5.71]
-0.01
[-2.69]
-0.01
[-3.83]
0.22
[9.06]
-0.02
[-3.34]
CGW
-1.01
[-5.92]
-0.01
[-1.96]
-0.01
[-4.04]
0.23
[9.26]
-0.02
[-3.70]
0.00
[1.851
-0.83
[-4.46]
-0.01
[-2.47]
-0.01
[-3.97]
0.25
[9.01]
-0.02
[-2.99]
-0.06
[-2.60]
21,885 21,885 21,885
4.28 4.33 4.50
(x 10- 2 )
Intercept -6.06
[-13.47]
Age 0.06
[5.74]
Maturity 0.04
[7.31]
ln(Issuance) 0.93
[14.73]
Rating 0.03
[1.95]
Turnover
ln(Num Trds)
Obs
R 2(%)
-5.80
[-13.54]
0.04
[3.95]
0.04
[7.67]
0.91
[14.92]
0.04
[2.65]
-0.02
[-7.25]
-6.61
[-14.68]
0.05
[5.42]
0.04
[7.63]
0.83
[12.66]
0.02
[1.39]
0.23
[5.71]
22,046 22,046 22,046
32.58 33.92 34.14
168.70
[26.79]
-1.22
[-6.81]
-0.57
[-6.58]
1.43
[1.80]
-2.48
[-9.99]
166.50
[25.32]
-1.05
[-5.49]
-0.58
[-6.64]
1.57
[1.94]
-2.56
[-10.35]
0.15
[2.94]
158.27
[24.66]
-1.29
[-7.20]
-0.55
[-6.73]
-0.36
[-0.42]
-2.62
[-10.76]
4.34
[4.53]
22,046 22,046 22,046
5.29 5.43 6.04
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-u
Intercept 0.69
[5.19]
Age 0.02
[3.96]
Maturity 0.04
[17.51]
ln(Issuance) -0.04
[-2.34]
Rating 0.03
[4.30]
Turnover
ln(Num Trds)
Obs
R 2(%)
0.78
[6.09]
0.01
[2.46]
0.04
[17.67]
-0.05
[-2.80]
0.03
[4.64]
-0.01
[-4.17]
0.41
[3.13]
0.01
[3.55]
0.04
[18.29]
-0.09
[4.64]
0.02
[3.77]
0.12
[8.05]
22,046 22,046 22,046
26.47 27.29 41.78
-14.89
[-5.88]
-0.39
[-4.30]
0.27
[6.70]
2.44
[7.38]
1.05
[8.70]
VR
(x10- 2)
-16.19
[-6.30]
-0.30
[-3.28]
0.26
[6.72]
2.51
[7.64]
0.98
[8.45]
0.14
[4.46]
18,412 18,412
24.79 26.29
Panel B: Signed Volume Data Available (November 2008 - December 2010)
CGWsigned AVWsigned
(x10- 3 )
Intercept -0.38 -0.36 -0.54 8.94 12.49 -0.89
[-1.83] [-1.87] [-2.49] [1.96] [2.70] [-0.20]
Age -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.76 0.56 0.65
[-0.66] [-0.86] [-0.89] [6.29] [4.77] [5.52]
Maturity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.27
[1.26] [1.29] [1.67] [4.77] [5.37] [6.23]
ln(Issuance) 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.63 -0.92 -2.32
[2.21] [2.26] [0.51] [-1.00] [-1.47] [-3.51]
Rating 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.19 -0.02 -0.30
[1.02] [1.03] [0.88] [-1.15] [-0.13] [-2.01]
Turnover 0.00 -0.28
[-0.51] [-6.22]
ln(Num Trds) 0.06 3.93
[2.61] [8.44]
Obs 8,609 8,609 8,609 8,317 8,317 8,317
R2(%) 0.07 0.07 0.14 1.91 3.44 4.59
-17.51
[-6.99]
-0.41
[-4.60]
0.27
[6.65]
1.97
[5.27]
1.02
[8.56]
1.13
[3.88]
18,412
25.81
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2.4.2 Aggregate Illiquidity and Market Indices
In this section, we report two important findings of illiquidity measures at the aggregate
level. First, we demonstrate commonality among measures, and their time variation is
strongly connected with market conditions. Second, we show significant relations between
the illiquidity measures and market variables that are constructed to capture different aspects
of the market.
We first explore the time variation of illiquidity measures at the aggregate level. Figure
2.1 plots the time series of selected aggregate measures from July 2002 to December 2010.12
These aggregate measures are issuance-weighted averages of measure estimates. The solid
lines mark the start and end of the Crisis period, and the dotted lines indicate the bankruptcy
of Bear Sterns in March 2008 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
All the illiquidity measures comove in time and respond to market conditions similarly.
This common pattern of measures and their strong connection with market movement show
that the bond-level estimates of illiquidity share a systematic component. Price reversal
-y increases upon entering the Crisis period and peaks in October 2008 shortly after the
Lehman Brothers collapse with a value as much as three times higher than its values before
the crisis. The price impact A' and residual volatility o behave similarly, going up at the
end of 2007 and reaching its peak in October 2008. The dynamic ranges of these three
measures are about the same. Their peaks in September/October 2008 peaks are about two
to three times higher than their pre-crisis values. The minus sum of AR(4) coefficients 1
shows the same movement in illiquidity. It decreases during the crisis, which indicates that
bond returns are less mean-reverting or more illiquid then. The variance ratio VR exhibits
a variation of illiquidity similar to other measures, but with a lag. This lagged comovement
results from the fact that it uses the past T days in estimation.
Next, we study the connection of aggregate illiquidity measures and market variables. We
use the median as the aggregate illiquidity for each measure. The market indicators included
in our analysis are: 1) CBOE Volatility Index or VIX, 2) Barclays Bond Index Volatility,
3) CDS Index, 4) Term Spread, 5) Default Spread1 3 , 6) Lagged Stock Market Return, and
12
-y represents the price reversal family, and A represents the price impact family. All the other three
measures are shown.
13The correlation between the default spread change and the CDS index change is approximately 0.56.
Although they are indicators of credit risk, both of them are included in the analysis because one provides
information that supplements the other.
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Figure 2.1: Monthly Time-Series of Illiquidity Level Measures (Issuance-Weighted
Average)
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7) Lagged Bond Market Return. We obtain VIX data from CBOE (The Chicago Board
Options Exchange). The Barclays Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index and the 5-year
CDS index of the financial sector are gathered from Datastream (Thomson Reuters). We
obtain the 10-year government bond yield and the 3-month T-bill yield from the Federal
Reserve Bank to calculate the term spread. The default spread, which is the difference
between the Aaa yield and the Baa yield, is calculated from Barclays Bond Indices. Finally,
the stock market return data are from CRSP (The Center for Research in Securities Prices).
The summary statistics of market variables and aggregate illiquidity measures are reported
in Table 2.5. The correlations among these market variables are reported in Table 2.6. The
VIX index, CDS index, and default spread are highly correlated.
In the analysis, we regress monthly changes in aggregate illiquidity measures on monthly
changes in market variables. The specification is as follows:
ALt = a + b1AVIXt + b2ABondVolt + b3ACDSt
+ b4ATERMt + b5 ADEF + b6RRs_1 + b7R _1 + et, (2.32)
where ALt denotes the monthly change in illiquidity measure in month t from month t - 1.
AVIXt denotes the monthly change in the VIX Index in month t from month t - 1. Similar
notation applies to the other market variables. ABondVolt denotes monthly changes in the
return volatility of the Barclays Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index. ACDSt denotes
monthly changes in the CDS index. ATERMt denotes monthly changes in the term spread.
ADEF denotes changes in the default spread. Rt_1 is the stock market lagged monthly
return, and Rt_1 is the bond market lagged monthly return.
The regression results are reported in Table 2.7. They lead us to conclude that the
connection between the measures and market variables in normal time is different from that
during the crisis. This observation is generally true for all measures, except the variance
ratio VR, which does not have significant relation with market indices.
In the full sample period when the 2008 crisis data are included, shown in Panel A, the
two market variables that have the strongest connection with illiquidity measures are the
VIX index and the bond index return volatility. Monthly changes in aggregate illiquidity
measures can be explained by each of these market indices with R 2 values ranging from 14%
to 25% in univariate regressions. The movements of these measures are of approximately
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the same magnitude for changes in these market indicators". For example, an increase of 10
percentage points in the VIX index is associated with an increase of 0.1 in -y and o, and an
increase of 100 in A,. In other words, a VIX movement of 10 percentage points corresponds
to an approximately 20% change in illiquidity as measured by -y and o, and a 10% change as
measured by A'. When the bond index return volatility goes up by 100 percentage points, y,
a, and A' increase by 0.5, 0.57, and 420, respectively. The relation of changes in illiquidity
measures to other market indices is weaker. For example, the variation in the CDS index
and the term spread has a statistically significant relation to measure changes on their own
in most cases. However, this connection is no longer significant when including the VIX
index and the bond index volatility.
The results excluding the 2008 crisis in Panel B, however, show that the explanatory
power of the VIX index, the bond index, and the term spread weaken. In constrast, the time
variation in the CDS index, the default spread, and the lagged bond market return are more
connected to changes in illiquidity measures. For example, monthly changes in measure -y
and a, can be explained by the time variation in the CDS index with an R 2 of 17% while
the time variation in the VIX index accounts for less than that. Lastly, illiquidity estimated
by any measures has a stronger relation with market variables during the crisis, as judged
by R 2 .
1 4When A' is expressed in x 103
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics of Market Indices and Aggregate Illiquidity Measures
This table reports time-series summary statistics of monthly market indices, aggregate yield spreads, and aggregate illiquidity measures. Monthly
market indices are averages of daily values over a month. Monthly aggregate yield spreads and monthly aggregate illiquidity measures are the
medians of monthly yield spreads and monthly illiquidity estimates, respectively. The sample period is defined in each panel except for the CDS
index, whose data start from January 2004 onwards and the signed measures, whose data start from November 2008 onwards.
Panel A: Full Sample (July 2002 - December 2010)
VIX Bond Ind. Ret. CDS Term Spread Default Spread Lagged Stock Lagged Bond
(%) Volatility (%) (bps) (%) (%) Mkt Return (%) Mkt Return (%)
Mean 21.64 0.34 267.90 1.98 1.18 0.52 0.07
Std. Dev. 10.34 0.12 326.09 1.31 0.57 4.72 1.91
Yield y -yCGW I, VR 0CGWsigned AVW,signed
Spread (%) (x103) (x10-3)
Mean 1.25 0.37 0.32 0.64 0.07 1.61 0.79 0.01 3.54
Std. Dev. 0.92 0.22 0.13 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.25 0.04 1.86
Panel B: Non-Crisis (July 2002 - November 2007 and July 2009 - December 2010)
VIX Bond Ind. Ret. CDS Term Spread Default Spread Lagged Stock Lagged Bond
(%) Volatility (%) (bps) (%) (%) Mkt Return (%) Mkt Return (%)
Mean 18.79 0.30 152.85 1.88 0.98 1.10 0.14
Std. Dev. 6.71 0.08 201.25 1.41 0.20 3.70 1.45
Yield y yCGW AI VR 0 CGWsigned AVWsigned
Spread (%) (x103) (x10-3)
Mean 0.90 0.31 0.37 0.56 0.07 1.64 0.71 -0.01 2.40
Std. Dev. 0.44 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.58
C.,,
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Table 2.6: Correlation Matrix of Market Indices
The sample period is from July 2002 to December 2010 except the CDS index, whose data start from
January 2004. P-values are shown in parentheses. Correlations with statistical significance of at least 5%
level are boldfaced.
VIX Bond CDS Term Default Lagged Lagged
Index Ind. Ret. Index Spread Spread Stock Mkt Bond Mkt
Volatility Return Return
VIX Index 1.00
Bond Index 0.55 1.00
Ret. Volatility (0.00)
CDS Index 0.90 0.58 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Term Spread 0.45 0.33 0.55 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Default Spread 0.86 0.54 0.91 0.30 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lagged Stock -0.43 -0.16 -0.26 0.01 -0.27 1.00
Mkt Return (0.00) (0.12) (0.02) (0.89) (0.01)
Lagged Bond -0.06 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.32 1.00
Mkt Return (0.55) (0.96) (0.63) (0.77) (0.75) (0.00)
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Table 2.7: Time Variation in Aggregate Illiquidity Measures and Market Indices
This table reports regression of monthly changes in measures on monthly changes in market indices. The market indices are in percentage, unless otherwise noted. Newey-
West t-statistics are reported in brackets. The sample period is that specified in each panel except CDS index, whose data are available from January 2004 onwards.
Panel A: Full Sample (July 2002 - December 2010)
-y AI (x 103)
Intercept
AVIX
ABond Index
Return Volatility
ACDS Index
ATcrm Spread
ADefault Spread
Lagged Stock
Mkt Return
Lagged Bond
Mkt Return
Intercept
AVIX
ABond Index
Return Volatility
ACDS Index
ATerm Spread
ADefault Spread
Lagged Stock
Mkt Return
Lagged Bond
Mkt Return
0.00
[-0.75]
0.01
[3.41]
-0.01
[-0.98]
0.50
[2.76]
0.00 -0.01
[-0.49] [-0.80]
0.04
[1.53]
0.11
[2.05]
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[-0.80] [-0.75 [-0.72] [-1.14]
0.01
[3.56]
0.45
[2.54]
0.00
[-0.59]
0.01
[3.50]
-0.01
[-0.81]
0.42
[1.99]
0.00
[-0.45]
0.04
[3.00
0.05
[1.42]
0.14
[1.49]
0.00
[0.53]
0.00
[-0.72]
24.51 23.03 12.81 9.06 5.61 0.50 0.78 46.25
0.00
[-0.62]
0.01
[4.63]
-0.01
[-0.89]
0.57
[2.63]
0.00
[-0.48]
0.04
[2.24]
-0.01 -0.01
[-0.69] [-0.67]
0.11
[2.14]
-0.01
[-0.64]
0.12
[1.56]
-0.01 0.00
[-0.62] [-0.78]
0.01
[4.21]
0.57
[2.46]
0.00
[0.27]
0.02
[0.46]
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
[-0.67] [-0.66] [-0.62] [-0.63) [-0.59]
0.01
[3.13]
0.40
[1.92]
0.01
[0.88]
0.08
[1.61]
0.12
[1.87]
0.00
[0.11]
0.01
[0.07]
0
C)4
-0.01
[-1.00]
13.79 14.61 14.21 3.89 3.49 0.02 1.91 36.90
VR (x102)
-0.02
[-0.26]
0.01
[0.04]
-0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
[-0.26] [0.58] [-0.26] [-0.26] [-0.41] [-0.28]
-0.23
[-0.51]
-0.04
[-0.37]
-0.10
[-0.49]
0.24
[0.57]
0.01
[0.36]
0.00
[-0.72]
24.48 29.44 14.75 8.27 3.62 0.15 0.46 56.34 0.00 0.19 0.77 0.29 0.62
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2.5. APPENDIX
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Variance Ratio
Variance Ratio
Overlapping observations
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Figure 2.2: Variance Ratio using Overlapping Observations
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Figure 2.3: Variance Ratio using Non-overlapping Observations
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2.5.2 Monte Carlo Simulations
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Figure 2.4: Normalized root mean squared error of AR(1) estimates t1 (decomposed by the
Kalman filter) from Monte Carlo Simulations for pi = -0.4. N is the number of observations
used in the Kalman filter.
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Figure 2.5: Percentage of statistically significant AR(1) estimates 5 1 (decomposed by the
Kalman filter) from Monte Carlo Simulations for p1 = -0.4. N is the number of observations
used in the Kalman filter.
Chapter 3
Corporate Bond Yields and Illiquidity
3.1 Bond Yields and Illiquidity Level
We investigate at the bond level, how each illiquidity measure prices corporate bonds in the
cross-section, and which measures are the most robust. We find that almost all measures
individually are statistically significant in explaining the yield spread, while their economic
significance varies. The three most robust measures are the variance ratio VR, the residual
volatility o,, and the signed price impact AVWsigned.
Prior work includes Brenner, Eldor, and Hauser (2001), who report an illiquidity
premium in currency options between exchange-traded options and nontradable options.
No direct illiquidity measure is used in this study, but the exchange-traded options are
used to represent the liquid group, and the nontradable options are used to represent the
illiquid group. Covitz and Downing (2007) document the role of illiquidity, using heuristic
measures, in pricing very short-term commercial papers. More recently, Bao, Pan, and Wang
(2011) show that y explains the bond yield spread after controlling for credit risk and bond
characteristics (or heuristic measures).
We test the pricing implications of measures using monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regressions. We perform monthly Fama-MacBeth regression of yield spreads on illiquidity
level measures and control variables.
yit = oj + li'Lit + c'Controlt + sE, (3.1)
where subscript it denotes bond i in month t. yt is the yield spread, and Li is an illiquidity
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level measure or a vector of measures. Controlit is a vector of control variables, i.e., bond
chracteristics, credit dummies, and equity volatility.
Table 3.1 reports the results of the pricing test. To gauge the effect of illiquidity as
accurately as possible, we control for credit risk using rating dummies and for fundamental
risk of the bond issuers using equity volatility in the first column.' Bond characteristics
are added as control variables in the second column, which is the baseline in determining
marginal contribution of illiquidity measures in explaining yield spreads. Illiquidity measures
are then tested one by one, starting in the third column, and statistically significant measures
are then included in the horse races in the last three columns.
In the first column of Panel A,2 the coefficient of equity volatility is 0.02 with a t-statistic
of 5.79, i.e., bonds with 20 percentage point difference in the underlying stock volatilities
show about 40 basis-point difference in their yield spreads. Similar description applies to
bond characteristics variables. For example, a bond that is one year older than another is
expected to have 2 bps higher in its yield spread on average.
When including illiquidity in the regression model, all of the illiquidity measures except
7CGW explain the yield spread. The most economically important measures are -y, o-, and
VR, which have about 1-3 % incremental contributions on R 2. As for the magnitude of yield
spreads explained, the yield spread is 8.7 bps, 15.6 bps, and 6.1 bps larger, on average, for a
bond with one standard deviation higher in -y, a., and VR, respectively. For other measures,
the magnitude of yield spreads that are explained by illiquidity measures is smaller. A bond
with one standard deviation higher in illiquidity as measured by A', 4), and 7ycow is expected
to have 2.6 bps, 0.8 bps, and 0.4 bps higher than others in its yield spread.
To determine the most robust measures, we run a horse race of all the measures that are
statistically significant in their univariate regressions in the last two columns. The residual
volatility a,, and the variance ratio VR are the most robust measures of illiquidity level. On
average, an increase of one standard deviation or 0.39 percentage points in a, is associated
with a 16 basis-point increase in the yield spread, while an increase of 0.08 or one standard
deviation in the variance ratio explains an increase of about 7.4 bps in the yield spread. As
'The coefficient of the call dummy is not statistically significant. Hence, the call dummy is not included
in the regression.
21f we include only credit dummies in the regression, the average yield spread of bonds with ratings higher
than A is 93 bps. The credit rating dummies tell us that the yield spread of an A bond and that of a BAA
bond are 36 bps and 107 bps larger than AA and AAA bonds, respectively.
60
3.1. BOND YIELDS AND ILLIQUIDITY LEVEL
for economic significance, these two measures jointly contribute to a 5.1% increase in R 2 in
explaining the yield spread.
To test for robustness of the results, we examine orthogonalized measures for o, Y, and
A'. a, - E[a, IUE] is the portion of or not in the projection of the equity volatility. Similarly,
y - E[yI u, VR], and A' - E[AIea,VR], are the part of -y and A' that is not explained by
a, and VR. The result shows that the part of au not explained by the equity volatility is
also significant in explaining bond yield spreads with a similar coefficient as ou. The last
two columns show that the part of -y and A' not implied by o and VR does not play a role
in determining the yield spread after including a,, and VR in the model.
In addition to the residual volatility a, and the variance ratio VR, the signed price
impact Avwsigned is the other robust measure. The results of the time window when signed
volume data are available are reported in Table 3.6. In this period, the yield spread of bonds
with one standard deviation higher in their AVWsigned is about 5.6 bps higher than others
on average. In the horse race of these three measures, Avwsigned comes out to be significant
with 2.43 t-statistic, and the marginal contribution in R 2 when these three measures are
included is 8.1%.
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Table 3.1: Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Level Measures
This table reports monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of bond yield spreads on illiquidity measures and control variables. The t-
statistics in brackets account for serial correlation with Newey-West correction. Top and bottom 0.5% of illiquidity level estimates are winsorized.
Top and bottom 1% of yield spreads are trimmed. aE and Eq. Volatility denote the annualized volatility of stocks in percentage.
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Panel B: Non-Crisis (July 2002 - November 2007 and July 2009 - December 2010)
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3.2 Bond Yields and Illiquidity Risk
In this section, we examine the role of illiquidity risk after showing that illiquidity level,
as estimated by various measures, is priced in Section 3.1. We first explain how measures
of illiquidity risk are constructed in Section 3.2.1. We estimate measures of illiquidity risk
associated with illiquidity level measures that are significant in determining yield spreads in
Section 3.1. In addition, we include the Pastor-Stambaugh measure defined in Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) in our study. Then in Section 3.2.2, we turn to the pricing tests of these
illiquidity risk measures.
Besides the role of illiquidity level in corporate bond pricing, whether illiquidity risk is
priced is also central to our study. There are two strands in the literature regarding the effect
of illiquidity risk. Among others in the first group, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) propose
an asset pricing model adjusted for illiquidity risk. Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011) report that
illiquidity risk carries a risk premium, using Amihud innovations and Pastor-Stambaugh
estimates as the risk measures. In contrast, Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen (2011) show
that illiquidity risk is not priced in the corporate bond market, using the residual of an
AR(2) model for estimated transaction costs. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhtter, and Lando (2012),
using Amihud risk and roundtrip cost risk measures, document mixed results on the pricing
implications of illiquidity risk. Other prior work includes Li, Wang, Wu, and He (2009),
Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010), and Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2005).
3.2.1 Measures of Illiquidity Risk
We introduce the construction of illiquidity risk estimates. The illiquidity risk of an illiquidity
measure is defined to be the sensitivity of its yield spread changes on changes in the aggregate
illiquidity, controlled for the market, credit risk, and VIX index. We study illiquidity risk
associated with each measure of illiquidity as well as a popular illiquidity risk in Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003). The illiquidity risk proposed in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) is inspired
by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993).
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Betas of Level Measures
For each month, each bond, and each illiquidity measure, we regress the daily change in the
yield spread Yid on the change in market illiquidity level ALM to obtain its monthly beta
or illiquidity risk estimate of illiquidity measure. We use the median illiquidity level as the
market illiquidity. The regression used to estimate illiquidity risk is specified in (3.2):
Ayd - ai+# 'AY + pfreditADEFd
+ vIXAVIXd + ifALm + Eid, (3.2)
where subscript id denotes bond i and day d. Ayid is the daily change in the yield spread
of bond i on day d. AYdM is the daily change in the corporate bond market yield spread on
day d, which is calculated from the yield of the Barclays Investment Grade Bond Index and
the 10-year Treasury rate.3 ADEFd, which proxies for credit risk, denotes daily changes in
the default spread.4 AVIXd denotes daily changes in the VIX index. ALM denotes daily
changes in the aggregate measure of illiquidity L. #f is the regression coefficient of yield
spread changes on changes in illiquidity measure L for bond i, which is the illiquidity risk
for illiquidity measure L in a month.
Pastor-Stambaugh Measure
To estimate Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) illiquidity risk, we first estimate illiquidity
measure -y" at daily frequency from transaction-level observations in (3.3), where the
excess return signs the accompanying volume. The intuition behind this equation is due
to Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), who explain that the return reversals are usually
associated with high trading volume.
r c+1 = ai + #1rt + -yrssign(re)V + Et (3.3)
where an individual bond is denoted by subscript i, a transaction is denoted by subscript t,
and a day is denoted by subscript d. re is the excess return of bond i, which is ri - rM,t.
rM,t is the market return. The issuance-weighted average of bond returns is used for the
3The time to maturity of the bond index is approximately 10 years.
4The default spread is the yield difference between the BBB and AAA Barclays Bond Indices.
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market return. sign(rt) is -1 if the excess return is negative, and 1 otherwise. Vit is the par
value volume of the transaction. Finally, 7PS is the illiquidity cost in Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003).
We then estimate innovations in the aggregate illiquidity measure, similar to Li, Wang,
Wu, and He (2009), in (3.4):
A-ya'S = a + biAy'_ 1 + b27yS + 771 , (3.4)
where IS is the median of individual illiquidity measures of on day d, and Aydps is the
difference in illiquidity medians between day d and day d - 1. rd is the innovation of
aggregate illiquidity on day d.
The Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) illiquidity risk is estimated at monthly frequency
according to (3.5) with control factors such as the market return and the VIX index:
rid - rd - a ± #,AYM + Credit ADEFd + ,i3 ATERMd
+ #,vIXAVIXd + #,3 r/ad + Eid, (3.5)
where subscript id denotes bond i and day d. rid is bond i return on day d, and rf is
the riskfree rate on day d. Other factors are defined in the same manner as in (3.2), and
ATERMd is the daily change in the term spread.
Table 3.2 reports the correlations among illiquidity risk measures and bond character-
istics. #*" and #7 are moderately correlated with each other with a correlation coefficient
of 0.45. Other illiquidity risk measures except #PS and #VR are weakly correlated. For
example, the correlation between #9amma and #A' is 0.29, and that between #A' and u is
0.26. Within the same illiquidity measure family, 1 AVW,,i,d and 3 A' show a correlation of
0.33. The bond characteristics and trading activity variables have little correlation with
illiquidity risk measures.
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3.2.2 Pricing Implication of Illiquidity Risk
We empirically test the pricing implication of estimated illiquidity risk measures by
performing monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions in (3.6):
Yit = +: ± b3'i + c Controlit + fit, (3.6)
where subscript it denotes bond i and month t. yit is the yield spread, and L denotes
illiquidity measure j. #3t is the illiquidity risk of illiquidity level measure L or a vector of
illiquidity risks. Controlit is a vector of control variables.
The results are reported in Table 3.3. In Panel A when we consider the full sample
period, #6- is the most statistically significant illiquidity risk with t-statistic of 2.74. Other
illiquidity betas are not significant, except #7 and #V that are significant at 10% level.
Unlike illiquidity level measures, illiquidity risks have negligible economic significance in
explaining yield spreads, i.e., their marginal contributions in R 2 is less than 1%. In the last
column of Panel A, a horse race of #3O, and orthogonalized #7 and #VR is shown. We find
that 30u is still significant with t-statistic of 2.33.
However, when excluding the crisis period in Panel B. The illiquidity risk of ou is no
longer statistically significant in the horse race in the last column. In its univariate regression,
#3' is significant, but with little economic importance in explaining the yield spread as in
Panel A.
As far as the illiquidity risks of signed measures are concerned, #AVW'signed is significant in
explaining bond yield spreads, while #CGWsigned is not as shown in Table 3.7 for November
2008 to December 2010. The marginal improvement in R 2 provided by AVW"signed is about
1.6%.
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Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix of Illiquidity Risk Measures
The sample period is from July 2002 to December 2010 (except the signed measure whose data are from November 2008 to December 2010).
P-values are shown in parentheses. Correlations with statistical significance of at least 5% level are boldfaced. Top and Bottom 1% of illiquidity
level estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1% of monthly yield spreads and associated measure estimates are trimmed.
0 A < On 3 VR 3 PS 3AVW,signed Age Maturity ln(Nm Trds) Eq. Volatility
#TY 1.00
#A 0.29 1.00
(0.00)
#) 0.11 0.13 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
#4au 0.45 0.26 -0.09 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3VR -0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.06 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
#PS 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
#A VW,igned 0.00 0.33 0.18 0.00 0.04 -0.01 1.00
(0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.82) (0.00) (0.48)
Age 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 1.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.91)
Maturity -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.25 1.00
(0.01) (0.50) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.50) (0.58) (0.00)
ln(Nm Trds) -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 1.00
(0.18) (0.00) (0.72) (0.85) (0.05) (0.34) (0.33) (0.00) (0.04)
Eq. Volatility 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.26 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.29) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00)
H
C)
t
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Table 3.3: Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Risk Measures
This table reports monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of bond yield spreads on illiquidity
measures and control variables. The t-statistics in brackets account for serial correlation with Newey-
West correction. Top and bottom 1% of illiquidity risk estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1% of
yield spreads are trimmed. -E and Eq. Volatility denote the annualized volatility of stocks in percentage.
Panel A: Full Sample (July 2002 - December 2010)
Intercept
, 
l
(x10- 3 )
p4)
#7 - E[TY|/oGu]
3VR - E [OV3Rpa3u]
(x10 3)
Age
Maturity
ln(Num Trds)
Eq. Volatility
A Dummy
BAA dummy
Avg. # bonds/month
0.38 -0.91 -0.91
[5.20] [-4.54] [-4.53]
0.01
[1.87]
-0.91 -0.92 -0.91 -0.78 -0.93 -0.78
[-4.54] [-4.54] [-4.55] [-4.00] [-4.62] [-4.02]
0.60
[1.01]
0.02
[6.66]
0.24
[4.26]
1.00
[10.07]
216
0.02
[3.55]
0.03
[14.94]
0.20
[7.01]
0.02
[5.79]
0.31
[5.68]
0.95
[9.16]
216
0.02
[3.63]
0.03
[15.34]
0.20
[7.01]
0.02
[5.78]
0.30
[5.67
0.95
[9.18]
216
0.02
[3.64]
0.03
[15.10]
0.20
[7.00]
0.02
[5.80]
0.31
[5.64]
0.95
[9.19]
216
0.01
[0.85]
0.02
[3.47]
0.03
[15.29]
0.20
[6.98]
0.02
[5.83]
0.31
[5.68]
0.95
[9.18]
216
0.01
[2.74]
0.02
[3.56]
0.03
[15.15]
0.20
[7.03]
0.02
[5.79]
0.30
[5.64]
0.95
[9.17]
216
0.01
[2.33]
-0.07
[-1.73]
0.01
[2.94]
0.03
[14.99]
0.19
[6.17]
0.01
[5.20]
0.30
[5.17]
0.87
[8.20]
190
0.05
[0.20]
0.02
[3.55]
0.03
[14.36]
0.21
[7.03]
0.02
[5.77]
0.30
[5.66]
0.95
[9.22]
213
0.00
[-1.10]
-0.04
[-0.92]
0.01
[2.74]
0.0292
[15.45]
0.19
[6.22]
0.01
[5.23]
0.30
[5.13]
0.87
[8.18]
187
R2(%) 40.66 58.32 58.62 58.58 58.63 58.66 58.51 58.52 59.07
3ou
/3VR
(x 103)
/3PS
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Panel B: Non-Crisis (July 2002 - November 2007 and July 2009 - December 2010)
Intercept 0.32 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.74 -0.73 -0.70 -0.74 -0.70
[6.73] [-3.51] [-3.51] [-3.50] [-3.52] [-3.52] [-3.26] [-3.51] [-3.26]
#3- 0.00
[0.90]
#3\ 0.11
(x 10 3 ) [0.31]
0.01
[1.55]
#4a 0.01 0.00
[2.73] [1.10]
#VR -0.07
(x 103) [-1.36]
#Ps 0.25
[1.23]
#7 - E[37)3au] 0.00
[-1.09]
3VR - E[#vR|#u| 0.00
(x10 3) [-0.04]
Age 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
[3.93] [3.90] [3.89] [3.86] [3.8]] [2.89] [3.90] [2.76]
Maturity 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
[24.81] [24.57] [25.09] [25.29] [25.11] [22.80] [25.31] [22.49]
ln(Num Trds) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
[5.25] [5.25] [5.26] [5.26] [5.27] [4.94] [5.24] [4.98]
Eq. Volatility 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[5.49] [4.62] [4.62] [4.63] [4.64] [4.62] [4.08] [4.60] [4.13]
A Dummy 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19
[3.46] [5.26] [5.24] [5.21] [5.24] [5.23] [4.69] [5.28] [4.51]
BAA dummy 0.79 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.65 0.73 1
[13.35] [12.01] [12.03] [12.06] [12.00] [11.97] [11.49] [12.04] [11.42]
Avg. # bonds/month 203 203 203 203 203 203 180 201 177
R2(%) 35.66 53.11 53.19 53.24 53.23 53.20 55.18 53.20 55.52
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3.3 Horse Race of Illiquidity Levels and Illiquidity
Risks
In this section, we test the relative robustness of all illiquidity measures. We include the two
most robust level measures o, and VR, and two most robust risk measures #M-, and 3s.
This horse race is specified in (3.7). Table 3.4 reports the coefficients and other statistics
from monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions of the horse race. We find that the two illiquidity
level measures o,, and VR dominate in explaining the bond yield spread in both the full
sample and subsample. The illiquidity risk as proxied by #3- is priced only when the crisis
period is included.
yit = ci + li'Li + bj'#3f + c'Controlit + Eit, (3.7)
where subscript it denotes bond i and month t, and Li denotes illiquidity measure j or a
vector of measures. yit denotes the yield spread of bond i in month t. #3t is the illiquidity
risk of illiquidity level measure Li or a vector of illiquidity risks. Controlit is a vector of
control variables. 1i is a vector of regression coefficients on L3, and 03 is a vector of regression
coefficients on illiquidity risks or illiquidity risk premiums.
Table 3.4 reports the pricing test in (3.7). In the full sample as shown in Panel A,
residual volatility o, variance ratio VR, the illiquidity risk associated with the residual
volatility are statistically significant. Their marginal contribution to the R2 of the model is
about 4.5%. We know from Table 3.3 that the incremental contribution in R 2 due to #3 d. is
little. Hence, this incremental contribution in R 2 is from the two illiquidity level measures.
The coefficients on these three variables also tell us that only the two measures of illiquidity
level are economically significant in terms of explaining yield spreads. If we exclude the
crisis period in Panel B, the illiquidity risk no longer plays a role in determining bond yield
spreads.
Considering when the signed volume data are available in Table 3.8, we find that the
signed price impact AVWsigned is also important in explaining bond yield spreads. The
marginal improvement in R 2 from AVWsigned, 0s1, and VR is 8.1% for November 2008 to
December 2010 period.
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Table 3.4: Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Level and Risk
This table reports monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of bond yield spreads on illiquidity
measures and control variables. The t-statistics in brackets account for serial correlation with Newey-
West correction. Top and bottom 0.5% of illiquidity level estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1%
of illiquidity risk estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1% of yield spreads are trimmed. 0 E and
Eq. Volatility denote the annualized volatility of stocks in percentage.
Panel A: Full Sample (July 2002 - December 2010)
Intercept 0.38 -0.91 -0.96
[5.20] [-4.54] [-4.86]
0.41
[7.01]
VR 0.98
[6.75]
#au 0.01
[2.67]
Age 0.02 0.01
[3.55] [2.88]
Maturity 0.03 0.01
[14.94] [2.22]
ln(Num Trds) 0.20 0.19
[7.01] [6.21]
Eq. Volatility 0.02 0.02 0.01
[6.66] [5.79] [5.30]
A Dummy 0.24 0.31 0.23
[4.26] [5.68] [5.31]
BAA dummy 1.00 0.95 0.73
[10.67] [9.16] [8.75]
Avg. # bonds/month 216 216 192
R2(%) 40.66 58.32 62.77
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Panel B: Non-Crisis (Jul 2002 - Nov 2007 and Jul 2009 - Dec 2010)
Intercept
oa,
Age
Maturity
ln(Num Trds)
Eq. Volatility
A Dummy
BAA dummy
Avg. # bonds/month
0.32 -0.73
[6.73] [-3.51]
0.02
[5.49]
0.14
[3.46]
0.79
[13.35]
203
35.66 53.11
VR
3au
-0.78
[-3.77]
0.35
[5.90]
0.98
[6.18]
0.00
[1.40]
0.01
[3.02]
0.01
[6.07]
0.14
[4.98
0.01
[4.15]
0.15
[4.84]
0.56
[12.67]
182
58.64
0.02
[3.93]
0.03
[24.81]
0.16
[5.25]
0.01
[4.62]
0.20
[5.26]
0.73
[12.01]
203
T3
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3.4 Aggregate Yield Spreads and Aggregate Illiquidity
We have shown that illiquidity explains bond yield spreads at the bond level in Section
3.1. We now study how illiquidity explains the time variation in yield spreads at the
aggregate level. We regress monthly changes in aggregate yield spreads on monthly changes
in illiquidity measures and market variables. The specification is in (3.8). We first run
a univariate regression of yield spread changes on illiquidity measure changes. Then, we
include changes in all significant market variables to check for robustness of the results.
AY = a + b1 ALt + b2 AVIXt + b3ABondVolt
+ b4ACDSt + b5ATERMt + b6R + B 1 + Et, (3.8)
where AY denotes monthly changes in the aggregate yield spread in month t. The median of
individual yield spreads is used as the aggregate yield spread. ALt denotes monthly changes
in illiquidity measure L in month t. AVIXt denotes monthly changes in the VIX Index in
month t. ABondVolt denotes monthly changes in the bond index return volatility. Similar
notation applies to the other market variables. Rt_1 is the stock market lagged monthly
return, and R_ 1 is the bond market lagged monthly return.
To calculate yield spreads of bonds in the sample, we obtain T-bill and treasury rates
from the Federal Reserve Bank. We gather the rates at all maturities from 6-month maturity
to 20-year maturity. We then linearly interpolate the available rates to get the treasury rates
at finer maturities. The yield spread is the difference between the corporate bond yield and
the treasury rate at the same maturity. We use the yield spread median as the aggregate
yield spread, and the median of measures as the aggregate illiquidity.
In this analysis, we control for other market conditions to estimate the effect of aggregate
illiquidity on aggregate yield spreads. We first regress changes in the aggregate yield spread
on various market indices as shown in the first column of each panel in Table 3.5. We
keep only market indices that are statistically significant. Of all the market indices, the
VIX index is statistically and economically significant regardless of the sample window. Its
changes explain about 59% and 45% of changes in the aggregate yield spread in the full
sample and normal time, respectively. The lagged stock market return is included as a
control variable when the crisis period is excluded in Panel B.
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In the full sample, almost all measures explain the time variation in the yield spread as
shown in Panel A of Table 3.5. The most important ones are 7, A, and or which explain
about 30% of the monthly changes in the aggregate yield spread. They also have a similar
effect on the yield spread change, i.e., one standard deviation increase in illiquidity measures
-y, A', and a, is associated with the aggregate yield spread change of 28 bps, 24 bps, and
30 bps, respectively, in the univariate regression. When controlled for market conditions
by VIX, one standard deviation increase in illiquidity measures -y, A', and a,, explains the
change in the aggregate yield spread about 12 bps, 13 bps, and 13 bps, respectively. For other
illiquidity measures, one standard deviation decrease in yCGW accounts for about 13bps and
6bps increase in the univariate regression and the multivariate regression, respectively. The
effect of <D is weaker, with its coefficient being statistically insignificant when the VIX index
is included. Lastly, changes in VR does not explain the time variation in the aggregate yield
spread.
When we consider only the normal time by excluding the Crisis period in Panel B of
Table 3.5, the effect of monthly changes in the aggregate illiquidity on the time variation in
the aggregate yield spread becomes smaller. In addition, the coefficients of measure changes
have lower t-statistics. This result may be due to the fact that our sample includes the most
liquid tier of corporate bonds5 . Nevertheless, the monthly changes of illiquidity measures
still account for a considerable portion of the yield spread. Specifically, a one standard
deviation increase in illiquidity measures -y, A', and a, explains approximately 7 bps, 4 bps,
and 6 bps of changes in the aggregate yield spread, respectively. The effect of CGW and
4) is not statistically significant when we exclude the crisis time. In terms of explanatory
power, monthly changes in measures explain changes in the yield spread better during the
bear market. For example, the change in the residual volatility o, can explain the change
in the aggregate yield spread better with an R 2 increase from 15% to 30% when including
the Crisis period. This trend also holds for -y and A'. The increased explanatory power of
illiquidity on the yield spread during the crisis can also be seen in the incremental changes
in R2 . Specifically, changes in measures y, A', and a, have incremental contributions in R 2
of 3.8%, 2.9%, and 2.6%, respectively, during normal time. These incremental increases in
the explanatory power are about 1-3% less than when compared to the full sample when the
crisis time is included.
5The data filters are explained in Chapter 2. We need to restrict our sample to bonds that have enough
observations for estimation purposes.
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As for the signed measures, the results are not statistically significant, although AVW,Signed
improves the model with about 4.6% increase in R 2 as shown in Panel C. This insignificance
is due to the limited length of the sample period for which signed data are available.
Comparing the results of the full sample when the Crisis period is included in Panel
A and the non-crisis time in Panel B, we are able to draw a conclusion. The role of
illiquidity in determining the yield spread increases during the financial downturn. This
fact is evident in both the increase in regression coefficients of measure changes, and the
increase in incremental contribution to R 2 when the Crisis period is included. This finding is
consistent with Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), who report that an increasing role or -y during
the crisis. With these results, we address the corporate yield spread puzzle examined in
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) and Huang and Huang (2003). They point out
the credit risk only explains only a small fraction of the yield spread, especially for high-rated
bonds. We have identified that another determinant of corporate yield spreads is illiquidity.
Table 3.5: Aggregate Yield Spread and Aggregate Illiquidity
This table reports regression results of monthly changes in the aggregate yield spread on changes in
aggregate illiquidity measures and market variables. Newey and West (1987) t-statistics are reported in
brackets. The sample period is specified in each panel.
Panel A: Full Sample (July 2002 - December 2010)
' 'y CGW VR
Intercept 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.008
[0.47] [0.46] [0.73] [-0.00] [0.44] [0.13] [0.48]
AIlliquidity 1.272 0.565 -1.005 -0.423 2.934 2.734
[5.31] [2.93] [-1.93] [-2.16] [0.49] [1.26]
AVIX 0.037 0.031 0.036 0.038
[8.49] [7.45] [8.64] [9.04]
AdjR 2(%) 59.49 32.54 64.12 6.72 60.39 -0.62 60.06
A,(x103)
Intercept 0.007 0.007 0.010 -0.001 0.007 0.008 0.009
[0.47] [0.32] [0.70] [-0.02] [0.47] [0.40] [0.67]
AIlliquidity 1.102 0.574 -0.770 -0.062 1.219 0.500
[4.72] [5.01] [-2.29] [-0.22] [7.17] [3.67]
AVIX 0.037 0.032 0.037 0.032
[8.49] [8.00] [8.65] [6.59]
AdjR 2(%) 59.49 26.47 65.57 2.03 59.10 30.08 63.07
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Panel B: Non-Crisis (July 2002 - November 2007 and July 2009 - December 2010)
-7 fCGW VR
Intercept 0.008 0.001 0.013 -0.007 0.008 -0.005 0.014
[0.78] [0.05] [1.24] [-0.57] [0.81] [-0.40] [1.43]
AIlliquidity 0.773 0.510 -0.310 -0.237 -0.041 3.081
[1.74] [2.36] [-1.36] [-1.47] [-0.03] [1.67]
AVIX 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.024
[4.59] [5.46] [4.93] [4.38]
Lagged Stock -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
Mkt Return [-3.23] [-3.07] [-3.33]
AdjR 2 (%) 44.53 9.26 48.34 1.60 45.49 -1.35 43.78
AI(x10 3 ) <D oI
Intercept 0.008 -0.003 0.010 -0.008 0.009 0.001 0.011
[0.78] [-0.28] [1.06] [-0.64] [0.80] [0.11] [1.08]
AIlliquidity 0.474 0.297 -0.368 0.147 0.874 0.418
[1.94] [2.86] [-1.46] [0.83] [2.35] [1.96]
AVIX 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.020
[4.59] [4.88] [4.36] [5.09]
Lagged Stock -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
Mkt Return [-3.23] [-3.39] [-3.15] [-3.06]
AdjR 2 (%) 44.53 8.06 47.44 0.90 44.13 15.14 47.12
Panel C: Signed Volume Data Available (November 2008 - December 2010)
CGWsigned AVWsigned(X 10-3)
Intercept -0.053 -0.112 -0.052 -0.117 -0.029
[-2.29] [-2.26] [-2.39] [-2.21] [-1.35]
AIlliquidity 0.570 -0.080 -0.002 0.007
[0.87] [-0.15] [-1.77] [3.45]
AVIX 0.016 0.016 0.014
[6.68] [6.42] [5.33]
ATerm Spread -0.477 -0.474 -0.487
[-6.87] [-6.96] [-8.51]
Lagged Bond -0.043 -0.044 -0.060
Mkt Return [-3.91] [-4.01] [-5.56]
AdjR 2 (%) 70.89 -2.37 69.54 -3.06 75.46
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3.5 Conclusion
The two main questions in our study are how to quantify illiquidity, and what are the
pricing implications of illiquidity level measures and their illiquidity risk. We review existing
illiquidity measures and propose new robust measures in Chapter 2. In addition, we study
their cross-sectional relations with bond characteristics and their time variation with market
variables. In Chapter 3, we show how illiquidity measures and bond yields are connected at
the aggregate level and individual level.
Despite differences in measures construction, we are able to establish similar connections
to bond characteristics for most measures. We find that old bonds with longer maturity are
more illiquid than young ones with shorter maturity. Illiquidity measures are also positively
related to the number of trades. For most measures, bonds with larger issuance size are
more liquid.
In addition, we show that these illiquidity measures behave similarly as the market
condition changes. Their time variation is also associated with the variation in market
indices such as the VIX index, the Bond Index Return Volatility, and the CDS Index.
Lastly, we empirically test the pricing implications of illiquidity level and risk in the
corporate bond market. A few illiquidity measures are shown to be robust to various
specifications. We establish that the illiquidity level is priced throughout the sample period,
while the effect of illiquidity risk is weaker, and driven by the crisis. This finding suggests
that illiquidity level dominates illiquidity risk in terms of explaining bond yield spreads.
As for future work, the measures in these studies can be applied to estimate illiquidity
in other markets, possibly with minor changes. The characteristics of measures and their
pricing implications may be different. However, it is expected that results should be along
the same line for markets that are similar to the corporate bond market, such as the treasury
market.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Level (continued)
Table 3.6: Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Level Measures (continued)
This table reports monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of bond yield spreads on illiquidity
measures and control variables. The t-statistics in brackets account for serial correlation with Newey-
West correction. Top and bottom 0.5% of illiquidity level estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1%
of yield spreads are trimmed.
Panel A: Signed Volume Data Available (November 2008 - December 2010)
0.18 -2.02 -2.01
[0.99] [-7.34] [-7.40]
0.00
[-0.33]
Age
Maturity
ln(Num Trds)
Eq. Volatility
A Dummy
BAA dummy
Avg. # bonds/month
0.04
[10.65]
0.63
[6.16]
1.49
[6.36
323
0.00
[-0.88]
0.03
[15.36]
0.36
[9.54]
0.03
[10.74]
0.67
[6.63]
1.53
[6.57]
323
0.00
[-0.90]
0.03
[15.23]
0.36
[9.66]
0.03
[10.73]
0.68
[6.64]
1.53
[6.58]
323
-1.94 -2.35 -1.82 -2.18
[-7.29] [-14.83] [-6.83] [-11.00]
6.28
[7.00]
-0.01
[-1.66]
0.02
[14.60]
0.35
[9.69]
0.03
[10.69]
0.67
[6.64]
1.52
[6.56]
321
0.86
[11.90]
-0.02
[-2.69]
-0.01
[-1.37]
0.39
[11.01]
0.03
[9.88]
0.54
[6.11]
1.27
[6.60]
323
1.20
[4.38]
0.00
[-0.34]
0.02
[12.59]
0.33
[7.66]
0.03
[10.06]
0.62
[5.78]
1.37
[5.46]
281
2.00
[2.42]
0.86
[12.78]
1.16
[4.21]
-0.01
[-1.26]
-0.01
[-2.58]
0.35
[8.90]
0.03
[9.47]
0.48
[5.04]
1.11
[5.18]
279
R2(%) 50.67 58.89 58.90 59.50 64.69 60.51 66.99
Intercept
'yCGWsigned
AVW,signed
ogU
VR
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3.6.2 Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Risk (continued)
Table 3.7: Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Risk Measures (continued)
This table reports monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of bond yield spreads on illiquidity
measures and control variables. The t-statistics account for serial correlation with Newey-West correction.
Top and bottom 1% of illiquidity risk estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1% of yield spreads are
trimmed.
Panel A: Signed Volume Data Available (November 2008 - December 2010)
Intercept
0A VWsigned
Age
Maturity
ln(Num Trds)
Eq. Volatility
A Dummy
BAA dummy
Avg. # bonds/month
0.18 -2.02
[0.99] [-7.34]
0.00
[-0.88]
0.03
[15.36]
0.36
[9.54]
0.04 0.03
[10.65] [10.74]
0.63 0.67
[6.16] [6.63]
1.49 1.53
[6.36] [6.57]
323 323
50.67 58.89
-2.36
[-6.42]
0.06
[0.47]
-0.02
[-2.56]
0.02
[11.39]
0.40
[7.36]
0.04
[9.48]
0.78
[8.23]
1.58
[7.18]
230
60.50
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3.6.3 Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Level and Risk
(continued)
Table 3.8: Bond Yield Spread and Illiquidity Level and Risk (continued)
This table reports monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of bond yield spreads on illiquidity
measures and control variables. The t-statistics in brackets account for serial correlation with Newey-
West correction. Top and bottom 0.5% of illiquidity level estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1%
of illiquidity risk estimates are winsorized. Top and bottom 1% of yield spreads are trimmed.
Panel A: Signed Volume Data Available (November 2008 - December 2010)
Intercept
c-u
VR
AVW,signed
Age
Maturity
ln(Num Trds)
Eq. Volatility
A Dummy
BAA dummy
Avg. # bonds/month
0.18 -2.02
[0.99] [-7.34]
0.04
[10.65]
0.63
[6.16]
1.49
[6.36]
323
0.00
[-0.88]
0.03
[15.36]
0.36
[9.54]
0.03
[10.74]
0.67
[6.63]
1.53
[6.57]
323
50.67 58.89 66.98
-2.18
[-11.08]
0.86
[12.80]
1.17
[4.20]
2.03
[2.47]
0.00
[1.55]
-0.01
[-1.29]
-0.01
[-2.57]
0.35
[8.97]
0.03
[9.42]
0.48
[5.02]
1.11
[5.16]
279
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Chapter 4
Impact of the 2008 Short-Sale Ban on
the Financial Market
4.1 Introduction
An investor can short sell stocks at the current price by borrowing them from another party
with a lending fee. At a later date, the investor needs to buy these stocks at a new price
and return them to the lender. He may profit from the difference in the stock prices less the
lending fee. Short-sale constraints vary in form. They range from expensive lending fees to
short-sale bans. The impact of short-sale constraints on stocks as well as on their futures
and options is controversial and needs to be further investigated.
One early theoretical work, Miller (1977), reasons that asset prices are optimistic
under short-sale constraints when investors have heterogeneous expectations. Under such
expectations, Jarrow (1980) argues that short-sale constraints can cause prices to move in
either direction. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) show that short-sale constraints prevent
informative trades but do not cause overpricing under a rational expectations framework.
Alternatively, Duffie, Girleanu, and Pedersen (2002) present a model explaining that stock
prices increase and then decrease under short-sale constraints. Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006)
show that short-sale constraints increase asset prices for allocational trade and decrease them
for informational trade. The price volatility is shown to decrease for allocational trade and
increase for informational trade.
On the empirical side, Jones and Lamont (2002), using data from 1926 to 1933, document
that stocks are overvalued due to expensive short selling costs. Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007)
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find that short-sale constraints are likely to cause overpricing in the Hong Kong market. They
also report that return volatility goes up in the presence of short selling. Bris, Goetzmann,
and Zhu (2007) analyze data in 46 stock markets and document that short-sale constraints
hinder price discovery in two respects: first, the amount of private information in prices;
second, the speed of price adjustment. They also find market returns to be less negatively
skewed under a short-sale ban.
The question being addressed in this work is how a short-sale ban, the most extreme
scenario of short-sale constraints, affects the equity market as well as the derivatives market.
The event in our study is the short-sale ban imposed by SEC (The US Securities and
Exchange Commission) from September 19, 2008 to October 8, 2008.1 This short-sale ban
is implemented almost immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15,
2008, in hopes of stabilizing the financial market. Around the same time, the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act was proposed and became effective near the end of the short-sale
ban period. We apply empirical tests to banned stocks and their futures and options around
the ban, and report three main results.
First, the banned stocks, as measured by cumulative abnormal returns, are overvalued
under the ban. Furthermore, the return volatility of those banned stocks is higher relative to
the market. Second, there is evidence that implies a demand shift to the futures market to
replicate short selling. Examples include addition of futures on banned stocks during the ban
as well as selling pressure on these futures contracts. Third, in the option market, puts have
significantly higher implied volatility relative to calls, implying puts are in greater demand.
Our work contributes to the literature in two ways. First, the overvaluation of stocks during
the ban confirms the prediction of a few aforementioned theoretical studies. Second, we add
these results of the derivatives market to the empirical literature.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the short-sale ban
event, related data, and the sample. Section 4.3 outlines empirical tests and reports results
in the equity market. The futures and option markets are then examined in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 concludes.
'As of the time of this writing, there are a number of other ongoing studies examining this short-sale ban.
Examples include Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009), Grundy, Lim, and Verwijmeren (2009), and Battalio
and Schultz (2010).
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4.2 Event and Data
We provide background of the event and the data used in our study in this section. Section
4.2.1 outlines the ban and other related actions by policy makers. The sample is described
in Section 4.2.2 with their statistics given in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Short-sale Ban Event
The event in this study is the short-sale ban imposed in September 2008 by SEC (The US
Securities and Exchange Commission). SEC decided to implement this ban shortly after
Lehman Brothers had announced its bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. A number of
companies such as AIG also seemed to be in critical condition. In response to this financial
turmoil, SEC announced a temporary short-sale ban on 797 financial stocks on Thursday,
September 18, 2008 to be effective the next day [U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(2008a)]. The details of important events are listed in Table 4.1. Another important event
during this time is the attempt to pass the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
or the bailout bill. This bill, proposed by the Treasury Department, was rejected by The
House of Representatives on September 29, 2008. The House later passed the revised bill
and the President signed it on October 3, 2008.
The short-sale ban had been initially set to terminate on Thursday, October 2, 2008.
However, SEC annouced on this date that the ban would extend until three business days
after the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act [U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (2008b)]. As a result, the short-sale ban ended on Wednesday,
October 8, 2008, and those stocks on the ban list were protected from short selling for
13 days, starting on September 19, 2008. The initial list of stocks banned for short selling
consists of 797 financial stocks. During the period of these 13 days, 10 stocks were removed
from the list, and 134 were added to the list at different times as shown in Table 4.2.
4.2.2 Data
Our sample consists of 686 financial stocks on the ban list described in Table 4.3. We exclude
a small number of stocks on the initial short-sale ban list for various reasons. For example,
some stocks are delisted from the ban list, some undergo mergers, and some are delisted
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Table 4.1: Timeline of Short-Sale Ban and Related Events
This table summarizes the short-sale ban and related events with references. The first column gives the
number of trading days relative to the first day of the short-sale ban.
Day Date Event Reference
-2 Wednesday SEC annouced a naked short-sale ban on all stocks to SEC Release
September 17, 2008 begin on September 18 and end on October 1. This No. 34-58572
regulation was later extended and made permanent
(SEC Release Nos. 34-58711 and 34-58773).
-1 Thursday After market closed, SEC announced a short-sale ban SEC Release
September 18, 2008 on 797 financial stocks to begin on September 19 and No. 34-58592
terminate on Thursday, October 2. Market makers
were exempt from this ban for their bona fide market
making and hedging until 11:59pm on September 19.
o Friday Short-sale ban started.
September 19, 2008
Sunday SEC amended Release No. 34-58592 to exempt SEC Release
September 21, 2008 market makers for the entire duration of the ban. No. 34-58611.
SEC further specified that market makers could
not short sell if they know "that the customer's
or counterparty's transaction will result in the
customer or counterparty establishing or increasing
an economic net short position (i.e., through actual
positions, derivatives, or otherwise)."
6 Monday House of Representatives rejected the $700 billion Treasury
September 29, 2008 bailout bill. Department
Press Release
9/29 hp1168
8 Wednesday Senate passed the bill.
October 1, 2008
9 Thursday SEC announced short-sale ban extension to be the SEC Release
October 2, 2008 earlier of 1) three business days from the President's No. 34-58723
signing of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008 or 2) 11:59 p.m. on Friday, October 17, 2008.
10 Friday Congress passed the bill and President Bush signed Public Law 110-
October 3, 2008 the Act. 343
13 Wednesday Short-sale ban terminated.
October 8, 2008
Table 4.2: Short-Sale Banned Stocks
Category Number of Stocks
Stocks on initial short-sale ban list 797
Stocks removed from short-sale ban list 10
Stocks added to short-sale ban list 134
Total stocks involved 941
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from the exchange.
We obtain stock data from July 2000 to December 2008 from CRSP (The Center for
Research in Security Prices). We collect index data from CRSP and Datastream for the
same period. The factor data are gathered from WRDS (Wharton Research Data Services),
which in turn obtains the data from Kenneth French's website. These three sets of data
allow us to empirically test for the impact of the short-sale ban on the equity market. In
addition to studying the equity market, we examine effects of the short-sale ban on the
derivatives markets. We obtain futures data from OneChicago Exchange.2 The option data
are obtained from OptionMetrics. Table 4.4 summarizes the datasets and their sources.
To facilitate subsequent discussion, we introduce symbols used for indices and factors
as well as the sample in Table 4.5. For market factors, we denote the value-weighted index
of CRSP by CRSP and the Standard and Poor 500 index by S&P500. FIN denotes the
financial sector of S&P500. The size and value factors in Fama and French (1993) are denoted
by SMB and HML, respectively. Lastly, UMD stands for the momentum factor in Carhart
(1997). As for the sample, we denote the whole sample by SSB or short-sale banned stocks.
The stocks in the sample can be broken down into subsamples based on the existence of their
options and futures. Subscript 0 denotes the existence of options, and subscript F denotes
the existence of futures. Subscript N denotes that neither futures nor options for those
subsamples are available. For example, the symbol for short-sale banned stocks that have
options and futures traded is SSBOF. For some stocks, their futures were introduced for the
first time during the ban. We use F' and their addition dates to denote this feature. For
example, SSBOF'10/0 2 is the symbol for short-sale banned stocks with options and futures
added on October 2, 2008.
These 686 financial stocks in the sample can be further classified based on their SIC codes
(Standard Industrial Classification). Table 4.6 reports the breakdown of the sample with
the percentage of market capitalization. The largest subgroup of the sample is depository
institutions. Stocks in this subgroup account for about 51% of the sample by market
capitialization. The second largest subgroup is insurance whose market capitialization claims
about 32% of the sample. The third largest group consists of brokers and exchanges. A few
stocks belong to other subgroups, such as credit institutions and holding companies.
2We thank two anonymous agents at the Exchange for providing futures data.
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Table 4.3: Sample Description
Category Number of Stocks
Financial common stocks on initial short-sale ban list 723
Less excluded stocks (e.g., short-sale ban list delisting, mergers, 21
exchange delisting)
Less stocks which were less than one year old 16
Stocks in sample 686
Table 4.4: Data Sources
Data Source
Indices CRSP
Stocks CRSP and Datastream
Options OptionMetrics
Futures OneChicago
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Table 4.5: Symbol Description
This table lists symbols and their description used in this study.
Panel A: Indices and Factors
Symbol Description
CRSP CRSP value-weighted index
S&P500 S&P index
FIN Financial constituents of S&P 500 index
SMB The size factor as defined in Fama and French (1993)
HML The value factor as defined in Fama and French (1993)
UMD The momentum factor as defined in Carhart (1997) and
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
Panel B: Sample and Subsamples
Symbol Description Number of Stocks
SSB: Sample (financial stocks subject to the SEC 2008 short-sale 686
ban)
SSBoF SSB stocks with options and futures 77
SSBO SSB stocks with options 7
SSBN SSB stocks with neither options nor futures 361
SSBOF' SSB stocks with options whose futures were introduced 106
during the ban
SSBOF'10/ 02  SSB stocks with options whose futures were introduced on 33
October 2, 2008
SSBNF' SSB stocks with neither options nor futures whose futures 133
were introduced during the ban
SSBNF'10/02 SSB stocks with neither options nor futures whose futures 36
were introduced on October 2, 2008
SSBNO'F' SSB stocks with neither options nor futures whose options 2
and futures were introduced during on October 2, 2008
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Table 4.6: Composition of the Sample (SSB) Based on Standard Industrial
Classification Codes.
The market capitalization is the average for July 2000 to June 2008.
SIC Codes Description # stocks % of total Market Cap % of total
(by # stocks) (in $B) (by mkt cap)
6xxx: Finance, insurance, and 686 100% 2,133.06 100%
real estate
60xx Depository institutions 495 72.16% 1,082.27 50.74%
61xx Non-depository credit in- 8 1.17% 11.48 0.54%
stitutions
62xx Security and commodity 56 8.16% 323.03 15.14%
brokers, dealers,
exchanges, and services
63xx Insurance carriers 107 15.60% 690.85 32.39%
64xx Insurance agents, brokers, 0 0% 0 0%
and services
65xx Real estate 0 0% 0 0%
67xx Holding and other invest- 20 2.92% 25.43 1.19%
ment offices
4.2.3 Definitions and Notation
In this section, we define variables that will be used in subsequent sections. They are returns,
turnovers, and their aggregates. Unless otherwise specified, subscript i denotes a stock, and
subeript t denotes a day.
For stock i at time t, we define the following variables:
" Return, RAt
Pit - Piti (4.1)
Pit-1
where Pit is the price of stock i on day t.
* Market capitalization, Mit
Mit PitSit, (4.2)
where Sit is the number of shares outstanding of stock i on day t
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* Turnover, Tit
Xit
sit,
where Xit is the share volume of stock i on day t
(4.3)
The aggregate variables, i.e. the equal-weighted and value-weighted measures, are defined
as follows.
Equal-weighted return, R W
N
R EW =t~w
i=1
where i is the index for stock, and N is the total number of stocks.
Value-weighted return, Rvw
(4.4)
N
R=w Z -i-1 R
N
= ( wi-1 R
i-i
where wi_1 is the weight for stock i using market capitalization of time t - 1.
e Equal-weighted turnover, rfEW
,TEW=IIVeN tuN hVW
i=1 i=1
eValue-weighted turnover, rivw
N
TvW it-1 it-1
i=1j=1 jit-19t-1
N
Wi-1 T
i-i
The superscript VW and EW are also used for other variables for the value-weighted
aggregate and equal-weighted aggregate, respectively.
(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)
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4.2.4 Summary Statistics
The stocks in the sample are relatively small. More than 75% of them have the market
capitalization lower than $800 million. The median of the market capitalization is about
$200 million. There are a handful of very large stocks as shown in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Market Capitalization of the Sample (SSB) for July 2000 to June 2008
This table reports cross-sectional summary statistics of market capitalization averages for stocks in the
sample for July 2000 to June 2008.
SSB
Observations 686
AvgCap (in million $)
Mean 3,276.77
Median 195.99
Std. Dev. 15,381.38
Percentiles:
Min 6.49
plo 41.55
p2 5  74.75
p7 5  799.92
p90  4,190.83
Max 224,686.00
From the daily data, we explore the distributional characteristics of the indices,
portfolios, and the sample for the period of July 2000 to June 2008 which totals 2009 days.
Table 4.8 reports statistics for daily returns of the indices and portfolios and their t-statistics
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987). The
median returns of the market and the financial sector are 0.05% and 0.00%, respectively.
The financial sector is more volatile and has slightly fatter tails than the market for the
sample period. Their first-order autocorrelation is very small and negative. The HML and
UMD portfolios' average daily returns are approximately 0.04% and exhibit higher kurtosis
than the market and the financial sector. The autocorrelations of the three portfolios are
small. The UMD portfolio is more persistent than the other two portfolios.
As far as the correlation is concerned, the sample SSB is very highly correlated with the
financial sector and is highly correlated with the market. The HML and UMD portfolios
are negatively correlated with the market, financial sector, and the sample. The size factor
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Table 4.8: Summary Statistics of Indices' and Portfolios' Daily Returns (in %) for
July 2000 to June 2008
Newey-West t-statistics are reported in brackets.
Statistic CRSP FIN SMB HML UMD
Observations
Mean
t-stat[mean]
Median
Std. Dev.
t-stat[std. dev.]
Skewness
t-stat[skewness]
Kurtosis
t-stat[kurtosis]
Percentiles:
Min
p1 0
p25
p7 5
p9 0
Max
Autocorrelations (%):
Pi
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
Pio
Portmanteau Qi
(Prob > Qi)
Portmanteau Qs
(Prob > Q5)
Portmanteau Qio
(Prob > Qio)
2009
0.006
[0.25]
0.049
1.090
[15.67]
0.139
[0.87]
5.229
[6.30]
-5.114
-1.384
-0.557
0.556
1.240
5.303
-4.41
-2.18
0.42
0.89
1.12
-2.88
-2.88
-1.76
0.72
-0.91
3.916
(0.048)
5.321
(0.387)
9.558
(0.480)
2009
0.002
[0.08]
0.000
1.416
[13.04]
0.407
[1.66]
6.889
[5.11]
-5.363
-1.582
-0.677
0.660
1.538
8.491
-4.85
1.48
0.24
-2.69
2.27
-5.30
-3.55
-4.60
1.93
-0.21
4.729
(0.030)
7.677
(0.175)
20.913
(0.022)
2009
0.013
[1.08]
0.03
0.525
[20.41]
-0.273
[-1.76]
4.356
[4.30]
-3.36
-0.63
-0.31
0.34
0.65
2.04
4.31
-2.70
-2.98
-2.68
2.85
1.24
4.47
-0.92
-1.19
-2.87
3.732
(0.053)
10.074
(0.073)
16.529
(0.086)
2009
0.042
[3.18]
0.03
0.564
[9.71]
-0.326
[-0.81]
11.277
[3.15]
-4.90
-0.48
-0.21
0.27
0.63
3.40
4.36
-5.15
5.80
-1.82
1.12
4.69
3.05
1.01
3.00
-2.59
3.828
(0.050)
16.844
(0.005)
26.530
(0.003)
2009
0.039
[1.72]
0.07
0.891
[11.87]
-0.739
[-1.81]
8.893
[3.09]
-7.29
-0.94
-0.39
0.47
1.00
3.86
14.11
1.15
1.02
0.22
4.56
2.06
1.72
0.98
2.71
-1.92
40.064
(0.000)
44.750
(0.000)
48.623
(0.000)
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is not correlated with other factors, except with the value factor, where the correlation is
about -0.2. Table 4.9 summarizes these correlations.
The distributional characteristics of the sample returns are reported in Table 4.10. The
value-weighted return, RVw, has a lower median and is more volatile than the equal-
weighted return, REw. It also has slightly higher kurtosis. RVW has a small negative
first-order autocorrelation while there is no autocorrelation in REW. Table 4.11 gives the
summary statistics of turnovers. The value-weighted turnover median, rVW, is 0.38%.
Its distribution is positively skewed and has fat tails. rVW is strongly autocorrelated
with the first autocorrelation os 73% and the tenth autocorrelation of 41%. The equal-
weighed counterpart, TEW, has similar characteristics, with a lower median and weaker
autocorrelations.
Table 4.9: Correlation Matrix among Returns of Indices, Factors, and Sample
(SSBvw) for July 2000 to June 2008.
Correlations shown are statistically significant at the 5% level.
CRSP FIN SMB HML UMD SSBVW
CRSP 1.000
FIN 0.855 1.000
SMB 0.070 -0.081 1.000
HML -0.499 -0.278 -0.202 1.000
UMD -0.351 -0.375 0.074 0.367 1.000
SSBVW 0.869 0.992 -0.055 -0.295 -0.363 1.000
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Table 4.10: Summary Statistics for Daily
July 2000 to June 2008.
Newey-West t-statistics are reported in brackets.
Returns (in %) of the Sample (SSB) for
Statistic RVW R EW
Observations (days)
Mean
t-stat[mean]
Median
Std. Dev.
t-stat[std. dev.]
Skewness
t-stat[skewness]
Kurtosis
t-stat[kurtosis]
Percentiles:
Min
p10
p25
p7 5
p9 0
Max
Autocorrelations (%):
Pi
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
p7
Ps
P9
Pio
Portmanteau Qi
(Prob > Qi)
Portmanteau Q5
(Prob > Q5)
Portmanteau Qio
(Prob > Qio)
2009
0.008
[0.30]
0.006
1.257
[13.78]
0.312
[1.46]
6.276
[5.64]
-5.397
-1.425
-0.623
0.618
1.372
6.767
-4.62
1.13
0.88
-2.62
2.76
4-63
-4.38
-3.98
0.79
0.20
4.287
(0.038)
7.620
(0.178)
19.148
(0.038)
2009
0.046
[2.88]
0.065
0.700
[16.28]
-0.056
[-0.31]
5.299
[6.27]
-3.227
-0.770
-0.358
0.451
0.840
3.897
-0.85
1.05
1.36
0.78
4.24
-2.10
0.79
-0.53
2.76
-0.70
0.145
(0.702)
4.497
(0.480)
7.213
(0.705)
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Table 4.11: Summary Statistics for Daily
for July 2000 to June 2008.
Newey-West t-statistics are reported in brackets.
Statistic TVW 7EW
Observations (days)
Mean
t-stat[mean]
Median
Std. Dev.
t-stat[std. dev.]
Skewness
t-stat [skewness]
Kurtosis
t-stat[kurtosis]
Percentiles:
Min
p1 0
p25
p 75
p 90
Max
Autocorrelations(%):
Pi
P2
p3
P4
PS
P6
p7
P8
P9
Pio
Portmanteau Qi
(Prob > Qi)
Portmanteau Q5
(Prob > Q5)
Portmanteau Qio
(Prob > Qi)
Turnover (in %) of the Sample (SSB)
2009
0.464
[35.05]
0.382
0.266
[6.86]
2.595
[3.98]
10.787
[3.28]
0.074
0.278
0.321
0.481
0.796
2.243
72.72
51.45
45.60
44.65
49.49
67.09
80.17
64.69
46.21
41.23
1,064.1
(0.000)
2,911.1
(0.000)
6,735.9
(0.000)
2009
0.288
[46.68]
0.252
0.133
[7.90]
2.725
[3.53]
15.635
[2.30]
0.057
0.183
0.209
0.316
0.447
1.698
60.65
43.76
40.12
37.87
40.95
54.20
67.68
54.22
39.46
35.45
740.11
(0.000)
2,076.9
(0.000)
4,756.0
(0.000)
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4.3 Impact on Equity Market
We now examine how the short-sale ban affects the equity market. In Section 4.3.1, we
empirically test for abnormal returns during the ban, and report that the ban results in
overvaluation of stocks. Then, we study the return volatility of the sample, and document
higher idiosyncratic volatility of the banned stocks, compared to the market in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
To get an overview of the sample and market performance around the short-sale ban event,
we first explore their cumulative returns. The definitions of the individual cumulative return,
the equal-weighted cumulative return, and the value-weighted cumulative return are given
as follows.
" Cumulative return, CRit
t
CRit = ZRis, (4.8)
s=t 0
where s is the time index, and to is the reference date (starting date).
* Equal-weighted cumulative return, CR'W
CRtw = CRt (4.9)
i=1
" Value-weighted cumulative return, CRtvW
IN
CRYW = ( wu.-1 CR (4.10)
i=1
Figure 4.1 shows the cumulative return of the sample and that of the market, which is the
CRSP value-weighted index, around the short-sale ban. There is little difference between
the sample value-weighted return and the market return before the short-sale ban starts.
They begin to deviate sharply on the short-sale ban annoucement day and the first day of
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the ban. This difference is maintained throughout the ban.3 The same analysis is also true
when considering the equal-weighted return of the sample.
To evaluate abnormal returns (ARs) due to the short-sale ban, we use the market model
similar to Brown and Warner (1985) with the size, value, and momentum portfolios as
additional explanatory variables. We use daily data from July 2000 to June 2008 to estimate
model coefficients in 4.11. The estimation result is summarized in Table 4.12. The median
betas are 0.58, 0.26, 0.35, and -0.08 for the market factor, size factor, value factor, and
momentum factor, respectively.
" Market model of the excess return for stock i at time t,
Rit-r=a+3WKTRMKT f SMB MB MLtHML MD UMD- 4.11)
where rf is the riskfree rate at time t. RMKT is the market return, which we use the
CRSP value-weighted index. RSMB and RHML are the returns of the size and value
factors, respectively. Lastly, RUMD is the return of the momentum factor.
For stock i at time t, the abnormal return, ARit, is the difference between its realized
return and its expected return.
* Abnormal return, AR t
ARzt = Rig - E[Rit|It] (4.12)
where It is market information up to time t.
ARis = Rit - [&+ + / KT MKT _ f)+ SMB R MB + ^HMLt HML ± , UMDRtUMD + rf
(4.13)
The sum of abnormal returns over time for stock i between time to and time t is called
the cumulative abnormal return, CARit and their aggregate measures are given in the
following definitions. We then test whether the abnormal return and cumulative return
are statistically significant around the event window.
3After the ban, the sample cumulative return is also higher than that of the market. This evidence may
be the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.
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* Cumulative abnormal return4 , CARit
t
CARt = E ARs,
S=to
* Equal-weighted cumulative abnormal return, CARw
N
CARfw = ( CARit
* Value-weighted cumulative return, CARYW
N
CARvW wit-1CARiH EwtmAi
(4.15)
(4.16)
Table 4.12: Indices' and Portfolios' Betas of the Sample (SSB) for July 2000 to
June 2008.
Statistic SMKT ASMB HML UMD
Observations 686 686 686 686
Mean 0.587 0.421 0.394 -0.112
Median 0.580 0.262 0.350 -0.081
Std. Dev. 0.474 0.493 0.437 0.202
Percentiles:
Min -0.234 -1.593 -1.430 -1.194
plo 0.044 -0.110 -0.095 -0.325
p25 0.137 0.073 0.101 -0.192
p 7 5  0.973 0.814 0.707 -0.001
p 90  1.173 1.127 0.923 0.073
Max 2.029 1.872 1.998 0.643
The short-sale ban event starts on September 19, 2008 and ends on October 8, 2008,
with government actions starting on the sixth day of the ban, as discussed in Secion 4.2.1.
We consider both an event window of the first six days of the ban as well as an event window
of the whole ban in evaluating the cumulative abnormal return. Doing so allows us to check
the robustness of the result.
4For small returns, simple returns and log returns are approximately equal.
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The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) with their 95% confidence intervals for the
value-weighted sample and the equal-weighted sample are plotted in Figure 4.2. On the first
day of the ban, the equal-weighted AR of the sample is 2.89% and is statistically significant
at the 1% level as shown in Panel A of Table 4.13. From the day before the start of the
ban until five days later, the sample equal-weighted CAR is approximately 3.46% and is also
statistically significant at the 1% level as reported in Panel B of Table 4.13.' If the whole
ban period is considered, the CAR is about 6.03%.6 Around the ban termination, the AR of
banned stocks is -0.95% and -2.53% on event days 13 and 14, respectively. As for the CAR,
Panel B Table 4.13 shows a CAR of -3.34% due to ban termination. Additionally, the CAR
of the period well after the ban is small and statistically insignificant. With these results of
the CAR increasing at the start of the ban and decreasing at the termination of the ban, it
can be concluded that the short-sale ban causes overvaluation of stocks.
This finding is consistent with the argument in Miller (1977) that stock returns increase
in the absence of short selling. A number of empirical studies also document similar evidence
in different contexts. For example, Jones and Lamont (2002) use equity data from 1926 to
1933 and show the stocks with high short-sale costs are overvalued. Chang, Cheng, and Yu
(2007) show that stocks that are shortable in the Hong Kong market have positive CARs,
using data from 1994 to 2003.
5 The short-sale ban has greater effect on larger stocks in the sample, which can be seen from larger CARs
in the value-weighted sample, compared to the equal-weighted sample.
6Part of this CAR may be due to positive actions relating to the bailout bill starting on event day 8.
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative Returns. The period is 40 days before and after the short-sale ban.
The first and second vertical solid lines mark the start and end of the short-sale ban, respectively.
The vertical dotted line marks the date when the short-sale ban is announced.
102
0
(L)
CN
:
-)
0C
E
LOl
CHAPTER 4. IMPACT OF THE 2008 SHORT-SALE BAN
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Trading Day Relative to First Day of Short-Sale Prohibition
Value-Weighted SSP Equal-Weighted SSP
.95% C.I. 95% C.I.
Figure 4.2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns. The period is 40 days before and after the
short-sale ban. The first and second vertical solid lines mark the start and end of the short-sale
ban, respectively. The vertical dotted line marks the date when the short-sale ban is announced.
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Table 4.13: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Returns around Short-Sale Ban
Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns that are statistically significant at the 5% and 1%
levels are marked by ** and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Abnormal Returns (%)
Day Mean Two-Tailed p-Value Event
H,,: AR = 0
Ha:AR' #0
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
0.305**
-0.027
0.043
-0.119
-0.242
0.287**
-0.417
0.687***
-0.694***
2.178***
2.885***
-0.698**
0.365
0.247
0.211
0.444
-0.647
0.940**
1.007***
1.212***
1.132***
-1.213***
0.142
-0.951***
-2.533***
1.589***
2.345***
2.131***
0.395
0.939***
-0.329
-0.199
0.118
-0.338
(0.031)
(0.917)
(0.794)
(0.507)
(0.069)
(0.048)
(0.032)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.020)
(0.157)
(0.258)
(0.315)
(0.331)
(0.136)
(0.030)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.573)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.102)
(0.002)
(0.168)
(0.376)
(0.583)
(0.138)
SEC annouced naked short-sale ban
SEC announced short-sale ban (SSB)
SSB started
House rejected bailout bill
Senate passed bailout bill
Bailout bill passed by House and signed by President
SSB ended
Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia
TARP announced
103
CHAPTER 4. IMPACT OF THE 2008 SHORT-SALE BAN
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
Window Mean One-Tailed p-Value Window description
H,,: CAR'0,1 < 0
Ha: CAR',, 1 > 0
(-20,-2) 0.278 (0.339) Before the ban
(-1,1) 4.365*** (0.000) Two days around the ban initiation
(0,5) 3.455*** (0.000) Ban period (before TARP bill)
(0,12) 6.027*** (0.000) Ban period (after TARP bill approved)
(-1,14) 4.721*** (0.000) Before and after the ban
Ho CARO,ti > 0
Ha CARo,tl < 0
(12,14) -3.342*** (0.000) Two days around the ban termination
(18,53) -0.294 (0.394) After the ban
4.3.2 High Volatility of Banned Stocks
In addition to returns, we study idiosyncratic volatility of returns under the short-sale ban.
In calculating returns, we use futures settlement prices for both the sample and the market,
proxied by S&P500. We then adjust these returns by the market return, and use the adjusted
returns to calculate idiosyncratic volatility. Using settlement prices allow us to have less noisy
estimates of return volatility, compared to using high and low prices during the trading day.
We compare subsample SSBOF or the banned stocks with traded options and futures with
the S&P500 constituents with traded futures.7
Table 4.14 reports the summary statistics of volatility in Panel A, and the mean
comparison test in Panel B. Panel A shows that the market return volatility, as proxied
by S&P500 constituents, monotonically increases from the pre-ban period to the post-
ban period. However, the subsample return volatility increases during the ban and stays
approximately at that level after the ban. We then compare the return volatility among the
pre-ban, ban, and post-ban periods in Panel B. We find that there is no statistical difference
in return volatility between the ban and post-ban periods in the subsample. In contrast, the
return volatility of the S&P500 constituents during the ban is about 2% lower than that
after the ban, and this difference is significant at the 1% level. This evidence implies that
the short-sale ban causes stock returns to be more volatile.
7Out of 500 stocks in the index, approximately 475 stocks have futures data.
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Table 4.14: Daily Idiosyncratic Volatility
This table reports summary statistics and two-group mean comparison tests of idiosyncratic volatility.
The idiosyncratic volatility o-, is the volatility of SSBOF daily returns computed from their futures
settlement prices adjusted by the market return. The futures expiration date is December 2008. Symbols
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Summary Statistics of a, (%)
SSBOF
Pre Ban Post
Obs 77 77 77
Mean 5.697 10.620 10.266
Std. Dev. 3.866 8.201 3.968
S&P500 constituents
Pre Ban Post
Obs 475 476 475
Mean 3.169 5.160 7.171
Std. Dev. 1.936 4.046 3.313
Panel B: Mean Comparison Test of r,, (%) between Periods
SSBOF, Ho:
'6Ei,Ban -
0
i,Pre = 
0
EiBan - UrEi,Post = 0 O - 0i,,Prs=
Difference (%) 4.923*** 0.354 4.570***
(p-Value) (0.000) (0.734) (0.000)
S&P500 constituents, Ho:
O'fi,Ban -iPr = 0 ,B - U7fi,Post = 0 Orfi,Poat - cJi,Pre = 0
Difference (%) 1.992*** -2.011*** 4.003***
(p-Value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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4.4 Impact on Derivatives Market
We investigate the effects of the short-sale ban on the futures market in Section 4.4.1, and
on the option markets in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Futures Market
The first evidence of increased activity in the futures market is the addition of futures
associated with banned stocks in the OneChicago futures exchange. Figure 4.3 shows
monthly futures addition in 2008. In September and October 2008, 99 futures and 258
futures are added, respectively. These numbers of added futures are higher than almost all
other months in 2008. During the short-sale ban period, 284 out of the 289 futures introduced
to the exchange have their underlying stocks on the ban list as shown in Figure 4.4.
Increased demand in futures also supports the argument that the trading of banned
stocks shifts from the equity market to the futures market during the ban. Figure 4.5 show
the normalized open interests of subsample SSBOF and the market, proxied by an ETF
on S&P500. Before the ban, there is no statistical difference between the two normalized
open interests. However, the normalized open interest of the subsample goes up during the
ban, resulting in statistical difference with the normalized open interest of the market. This
difference remains about 20 days after the ban terminates. A similar trend is also true for
the normalized settlement price in Figure 4.6. While the normalized settlement price of the
futures on the S&P500 ETF generally decreases as the time gets closer to its expiration,
the normalized settlement price of subsample SSBOF jumps up upon entering the short-sale
ban period. SSBOF also has a higher normalized settlement price than the market during
the ban and stays higher for some time after the ban. There is no difference between the
two settlement prices close to their expiration.
Lastly, we find that the increased activity in the futures market is mostly due to selling
pressure by looking at futures premiums. Even though the banned stocks cannot be shorted,
their futures can be shorted. The payoff of shorting futures approximately replicates the
payoff of shorting the underlying banned stocks. We first define the futures premium as
follows.
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* Futures premium of stock i at time t, FPi
Fi (t,T ) - SiteftTr(s) (1FP,t (4.17)
where F(t, T) is the futures settlement price of stock i at time t, Sit is the adjusted
stock price of stock i at time t.
Table 4.15 reports the future premiums of banned stock and an S&P500 ETF called
SPY, which proxies for the market, around the short-sale ban period. As shown in Panel A,
the futures premiums of all subsamples SSBOF, SSBOF'1002, and SSBNF'1002 monotonically
decrease as we move through the pre-ban, ban, and post-ban periods. On the other hand,
the futures premiums of the market increase slightly in a monotonic manner during this
time. Panel B of Table 4.15 shows that the futures premium of SSBOF during the ban is
about 0.07 lower than that before the ban while there is no statistical difference between
those times for the market. Between the ban period and the post-ban period, the futures
premiums of all three subsamples, SSBOF, SSBOF'1002, and SSBNF'1002, are higher during
the ban, while there the market futures premium does not change. Comparing the post-ban
period to the pre-ban period, the futures premium of banned stock with traded options and
futures, SSBOF, is approximately 0.11 lower after the ban. However, the futures premium of
the market exhibits the opposite difference, being 0.03 higher in its futures premium before
the ban.
Monthly Futures Introduction in 2008
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Figure 4.3: Monthly futures introduction
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Figure 4.4: Daily futures introduction
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Figure 4.5: Normalized open interest of futures expiring in December 2008
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Figure 4.6: Normalized settlement price of futures expiring in December 2008
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Table 4.15: Futures Premiums
This table reports statistics and mean-comparison tests of future premiums around the short-sale ban.
The time window includes 40 days before the ban, during the ban, and 40 days after the ban. The sample
consists of 77 SSBOF, 33 SSBOF'1002 , and 36 SSBNF'1002 futures contracts expiring on December 19,
2008. The statistics of SPY futures are also reported. (SPY is SPDR S&P 500 ETF. SPY futures
is chosen to proxy S&P 500 due to unavailability of S&P 500 futures data.) Ban (ex. 9/29) is the
ban period that excludes September 29, 2008. The acronym FI stands for Futures Introduction which is
applicable for SSBOF'1002 stocks whose futures were introduced on October 2, 2008. Futures Premium,
FPt, is defined as Fi(t,T)-S!(1+rt)
i,t
Newey-West t-statistics for means are reported in brackets. 3 lags are used for pre-ban and post-ban
periods. 2 lags are used for the ban period. Symbols *, * and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Futures Premium Distribution
SSBOF SSBOF'1002
Pre Ban Ban Post Ban Post
(ex. 9/29) (after FI)
No. of Days 40 14 13 40 5 40
Mean -0.024*** -0.072*** -0.089*** -0.135*** 0.035*** 0.009***
[t-stat] [-22.17] [-3.44] [-3.82] [-9.88] [3.17] [3.62]
Std. Dev. 0.007 0.108 0.091 0.051 0.030 0.010
Min -0.060 -0.355 -0.355 -0.268 0.013 -0.013
plo -0.029 -0.163 -0.163 -0.200 0.013 -0.001
Median -0.024 -0.066 -0.067 -0.126 0.023 0.008
p9 0  -0.018 0.005 0.001 -0.068 0.088 0.024
Max -0.011 0.148 0.005 -0.026 0.088 0.038
Autocorrelations:
Pi -0.008 -0.286 0.027 0.672*** -0.137 0.600***
(p-Value) (0.959) (0.236) (0.912) (0.000) (0.684) (0.000)
P2 0.025 -0.127 -0.259 0.605*** 0.594***
(p-Value) (0.986) (0.427) (0.548) (0.000) (0.000)
SPY SSBNF'1002
Pre Ban Ban Post Ban Post
(ex. 9/29) (after Fl)
No. of Days 40 14 13 40 5 40
Mean -0.010*** 0.012 0.010 0.019* 0.030 -0.025***
[t-stat] [-9.57] [1.00] [0.76] [1.77] [1.85] [-3.15]
Std. Dev. 0.006 0.050 0.052 0.059 0.048 0.028
Min -0.022 -0.150 -0.150 -0.061 0.005 -0.113
plo -0.017 -0.004 -0.004 -0.048 0.005 -0.059
Median -0.010 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.011 -0.021
p 90  -0.005 0.054 0.054 0.111 0.115 0.008
Max 0.010 0.064 0.064 0.164 0.115 0.014
Autocorrelations:
Pi 0.259* -0.128 -0.036 0.324** -0.243 0.776***
(p-Value) (0.089) (0.595) (0.885) (0.033) (0.473) (0.000)
P2 0.024 -0.048 -0.066 -0.127* 0.698***
(p-Value) (0.232) (0.850) (0.952) (0.073) (0.000)
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Panel B: Futures Premium Differences Among Periods
Ban (ex. 9/29) - Pre
[t-stat]
SSBOF -0.065***
[-2.582]
SPY 0.021
[1.451]
Ban (ex. 9/29) - Post
[t-stat]
SSBOF 0.045*
[1.716]
SSBOF'10/02 0.025*
[1.853]
SSBNF'10/02 0.055***
[2.512]
SPY -0.009
[-0.512]
Post - Pre
[t-stat]
SSBOF -0.110*
[13.571]
SPY 0.030***
[3.148]
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4.4.2 Option Market
In addition to changes in the futures market resulting from the short-sale ban, we document
that puts are more valued relative to calls for banned stocks. An explanation of this evidence
is that investors can replicate short-selling stocks in the option market by buying puts and
writing calls on those banned stocks. A few studies that report put-call parity violation in
the presence of short-sale constraints include Evans, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2009), and
Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004). They have shown that short-sale constraints causes
put-call parity violation, and the degree of violation is greater for more stringent short-sale
constraints. Table 4.16 Panel A gives an overview of the implied volatility statistics for
options associated with banned stocks and the S&P500 options. The puts of the banned
stocks in each subsample, SSBOF, SSBo, and SSBOF'1002 , have higher implied volatility
(or more expensive) than calls during the ban and after the ban. The difference is most
pronounced in the subsample without futures, SSBo, and the subsample with new futures
introduced during the ban, SSBOF'1002- For example, the put implied volatility of SSBo is
about 137% while their call implied volatility is about 97% during the ban. This observation
implies that there is more demand in puts of the banned stocks relative to calls, especially
when banned stocks do not have futures. In constrast, there is little difference between the
implied volatility of the put and that of the call of S&P500. The put implied volatility of
S&P500 is 37% and its call counterpart is approximately 40% during the ban.
To empirically test for abnormality in put-call implied volatility, we define implied put-
call disparity as follows.
o Implied disparity, Aott
I,Put I,Call
1 IPut , (4.18)
Ut
where at is the implied volatility.8 The implied disparity is the put implied volatility
subtracted by the call implied volatility, normalized by the put implied volatility. This
value tells us how much more puts are valued relative to calls in a normalized term.
Panel B in Table 4.16 shows that while the implied disparity of S&P500 is about zero
8The implied volatility is obtained from OptionMetrics. OptionMetrics calculate implied volatility based
on the model in Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979).
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in all periods, subsample SSBo and SSBOF' 1002, during the ban, have implied disparity of
about 0.24 and 0.12, respectively. By comparing the pre-ban period and the ban period
in Panel C, the implied disparity of SSBo and SSBOF'1002 is approximately 0.16 and 0.08
higher during the ban, respectively. This difference is significant at at least 5% level. Between
these two periods, SSBoF and S&P500 do not exhibit statistical significant difference in
the disparity. Almost the same description holds when we compare the ban period with the
post-ban period.9 Comparing the ban period with the post-ban period, the implied disparity
SSBo and SSBOF'1002 is about 0.16 and 0.09 higher during the ban, respectively.
This test confirms that puts are more expensive during the ban for short-sale banned
stocks, especially for banned stocks without futures, and allows us to reach two conclusions.
First, investors resort to the option market to substitute their banned attempt to short sell
in the equity market. Second, this substitution in the option market is stronger for banned
stocks without futures.
9With an exception that S&P500 disparity in the ban period is slightly lower than that in the post-ban
period.
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Table 4.16: Implied Volatility and Implied Disparity
This table reports statistics of implied volatility and implied put-call disparity in Panels A and B. Panel C reports mean-comparison tests of
implied put-call disparity around the short-sale ban. The time window include 40 days before the ban, during the ban, and 40 days after the ban.
The sample consists of 30-day ATM option pairs (A = 0.5 for call and A = -0.5 for put) of 68 SSBOF, 7 SSBO, and 33 SSBOF' 1002 Stocks.
The ATM option pairs of S&P500 statistics are also reported. In Panel, Ban (ex. 9/29) is the ban period that excludes September 29, 2008. The
acronym FI stands for Futures Introduction which is applicable for SSBOF'1002 stocks whose futures were introduced on October 2, 2008. Implied
I,Put ICall
disparity, AoJ, is defined as
Newey-West t-statistics for means are reported. 3 lags are used for pre-ban and post-ban periods. 2 lags are used for the ban period. In Panel C,
two-sided t-tests assuming unequal variance are reported. Symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Implied Volatility (%) Distribution
SSBOF Put SSBOF Call SSBO Put SSBO Call
Pre Ban Post Pre Ban Post Pre Ban Post Pre Ban Post
No. of Days 40 14 40 40 14 40 40 14 40 40 14 40
Mean 68.74 104.19 112.94 65.73 98.83 107.85 104.49 136.91 130.77 91.49 97.40 112.93
Std. Dev. 9.52 9.35 12.84 8.50 18.40 13.60 18.00 37.37 27.62 12.56 48.14 20.74
Min 59.94 89.58 91.93 56.90 62.52 86.26 72.49 101.00 96.03 69.07 55.35 87.02
Median 65.50 105.01 111.10 63.40 96.62 105.12 102.42 125.03 127.40 89.26 84.94 107.41
Max 106.87 122.02 146.89 96.65 139.06 143.12 137.48 247.69 215.47 117.19 258.52 174.11
SSBOF'100 2 Put SSBOF'1002 Call S&P500 Put S&P500 Call
Pre Ban Ban Post Pre Ban Ban Post Pre Ban Post Pre Ban Post
(before FI) (after Fl) (before Fl) (after FI)
No. of Days 40 9 5 40 40 9 5 40 40 14 40 40 14 40
Mean 69.25 96.08 96.64 99.85 65.68 77.95 78.71 94.40 22.06 37.47 57.60 21.89 39.87 56.70
Std. Dev. 4.87 8.47 6.96 7.37 5.61 11.77 3.91 6.98 3.39 6.03 7.77 3.80 7.90 7.48
Min 63.75 86.77 89.23 88.43 59.74 71.04 73.94 82.44 18.20 31.06 42.10 17.65 27.13 39.91
Median 67.53 94.55 93.96 98.79 64.45 73.00 79.25 93.39 20.93 35.39 58.31 20.81 37.32 56.82
Max 87.10 110.02 106.70 121.64 80.82 108.47 83.36 114.89 33.61 52.06 74.45 35.29 54.75 74.98
I,
C)
C)
C
Co
C
H
Panel B: Implied Put-Call Disparity Distribution
SSBOF SSBo
Pre Ban Ban Post Pre Ban Ban Post
(ex. (ex.
9/29) 9/29)
No. of Days 40 14 13 40 40 14 13 40
Mean 0.031*** 0.004 0.049 0.035*** 0.084*** 0.192*** 0.241*** 0.078***
[t-stat] [6.24] [0.08] [1.62] [5.49] [8.00] [4.35] [5.98] [3.04]
Std. Dev. 0.039 0.194 0.103 0.036 0.068 0.247 0.172 0.147
Min -0.066 -0.575 -0.024 -0.062 -0.108 -0.445 0.014 -0.219
p10 -0.011 -0.024 -0.015 -0.011 0.001 0.014 0.021 -0.094
Median 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.042 0.090 0.207 0.219 0.056
p90 0.057 0.068 0.068 0.083 0.169 0.408 0.408 0.280
Max 0.195 0.379 0.379 0.109 0.211 0.626 0.626 0.470
Autocorrelations:
P1 -0.257* -0.034 0.048 0.067 -0.012 -0.307 -0.175 0.135
(p-Value) (0.092) (0.887) (0.845) (0.660) (0.937) (0.203) (0.481) (0.374)
P2 0.182 -0.051 0.063 0.093 -0.028 -0.216 -0.078 -0.052
(p-Value) (0.116) (0.966) (0.947) (0.749) (0.979) (0.288) (0.739) (0.635)
SSBOF' 1002  S&P500
Pre Ban Ban Ban Post Pre Ban Ban Post
(before (ex. 9/29 (after (ex.
Fl) before FI) Fl) 9/29)
No. of Days 40 9 8 5 40 40 14 13 40
Mean 0.036*** 0.084** 0.119** 0.117*** 0.029** 0.010 -0.064 -0.031 0.014
[t-stat] [5.63] [2.63] [3.27] [7.87] [2.29] [0.98] [-1.62] [-1.37] [1.53]
Std. Dev. 0.054 0.138 0.093 0.046 0.084 0.049 0.141 0.070 0.046
Min -0.094 -0.200 -0.013 0.070 -0.169 -0.171 -0.493 -0.116 -0.115
p10 -0.043 -0.200 -0.013 0.070 -0.094 -0.043 -0.116 -0.113 -0.054
Median 0.053 0.105 0.123 0.123 0.060 0.016 -0.041 -0.038 0.019
p9 0  0.094 0.253 0.253 0.184 0.127 0.055 0.036 0.036 0.048
Max 0.116 0.253 0.253 0.184 0.172 0.121 0.126 0.126 0.133
Autocorrelations:
P1 -0.330** -0.256 0.136 -0.533 -0.036 0.241 0.100 0.312 0.287*
(p-Value) (0.030) (0.367) (0.646) (0.115) (0.811) (0.114) (0.679) (0.209) (0.059)
P2 -0.070* -0.265 0.065 -0.088 0.305** -0.039 -0.065 0.155*
(p-Value) (0.086) (0.405) (0.875) (0.819) (0.037) (0.905) (0.438) (0.099)
C)
0
z
H
Panel C: Implied Disparity Differences Among Periods
Ban (ex. 9/29) - Pre
[t-stat]
0.017
[0.598]
0.157***
[3.201]
0.084**
[2.451]
-0.041*
Ban (after FI) - Pre
[t-stat]
0.081**
[3.612]
[-1.946]
Ban (ex. 9/29) - Post Ban (after FI) - Post
[t-stat] [t-stat]
SSBOF 0.014
[0.474]
SSBO 0.162***
[3.062]
SSBOF'1002  0.090** 0.087***
[2.524] [3.541]
S&P500 -0.045**
[-2.187]
Post - Pre
[t-stat]
SSBOF 0.004
[0.434]
SSBO -0.006
[-0.231]
SSBOF'1002  -0.006
[-0.397]
SHP500 0.005
[0.440]
SSBOF
SSBO
SSBOF'1002
S&P500
0
0
4.5. CONCLUSION
4.5 Conclusion
We investigate how a short-sale ban, the most extreme form of short-sale constraints, impacts
the financial markets. Using the short-sale ban imposed by SEC in 2008, we find three main
abnormalities in the equity market and the derivatives market. First, the banned stocks are
overvalued relative to the four factor model, and returns of banned stocks are more volatile
relative to the market return. Second, we document increased trading activity, mostly selling
pressure, in the futures market as reflected in settlement prices, open interests, and future
premiums. Third, we find that puts associated with banned stocks are in greater demand
during the ban relative to calls, resulting in higher implied volatility of puts. In addition
to these three findings, there is evidence showing that futures may be a more preferable
substitute for short selling, compared to options.
Our study has a policy implication. The use of short-sale ban has been a controversial
subject among regulators and researchers. These results show that imposing a short-sale
ban during a financial crisis may not lead to market stability as believed. Instead, banning
short selling could lead to a more volatile equity market as well as more pressure on the
derivatives market.
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